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THE GATr-MTN SYSTEM AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
AS INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR THE REGULATION OF
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: THE REMOVAL OF BARRIERS TO TRADE
IN GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
MARK L. JONES*
INTRODUCTION
This article explores the attempts made at the international level, both
within the GATT-MTN system and the European Community,1 to liber-
alize international trade and stimulate international competition in the area
of government supply contracts. It appears that government officials have
traditionally discriminated against or otherwise disadvantaged foreign sup-
pliers in their purchasing activities, and that such practices have constituted
one of the most significant non-tariff barriers2 to international trade in
purely quantitative terms.8
* Associate Professor, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. B.A. 1974,
M.A. 1979, Oxford University; LL.M. 1983, University of Michigan. The author would like to
acknowledge the able research assistance of Felix A. Losco, J.D. 1984, Mercer University,
during the preparation of this article for publication.
1. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - Multilateral Trade Negotiations
(GATT-MTN) system and the European Community are discussed infra notes 4-21 and ac-
companying text.
2. Apart from the imposition of tariffs, imports can be restricted in a great variety of
ways. In the late 1960s the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES began to inventory and cata-
log the non-tariff barriers (NTBs) of all participating countries. By 1973 the inventory con-
tained over 800 entries. See J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 433 (1977) [hereinafter cited as J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS].
The effect of the many non-tariff barriers to imports has become more noticeable in recent
years for a number of different reasons:
(a) The relative decline in the importance of tariff barriers due to:
(i) the progressive reduction in tariffs as a result of various rounds of multilateral trade negoti-
ations conducted under the auspices of the GATT, see infra note 5; (ii) the advent of floating
exchange rates since 1971.
(b) An upsurge in the use of NTB protectionist measures.
For a survey of GATT activity in the area of NTBs, see Focus on Quantitative Restric-
tions and Other Non-Tariff Measures, GATT Focus No. 28, March-April 1984, at 2-4.
3. See K. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 199
(1970).
See also GATT "The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations - Report of the
Director-General of GATT" (Geneva, April 1979) at 75, and the discussion in Bourgeois, The
Tokyo Round Agreements on Technical Barriers and on Government Procurement in Interna-
tional and EEC Perspective, 19 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 5 (1982). Bourgeois cites some re-
vealing statistics (at 12). For example, in 1967 in France only 0.99% of public contracts were
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Part I of the article draws some contrasts between the GATT-MTN
system of international regulation and that of the European Community, in
order to provide a context for appreciating the significance and impact of
the various international measures taken to open up national government
procurement markets to foreign suppliers. Although the focus of the article
is on the removal of barriers to trade in the field of government purchasing,
these considerations are also of more general relevance for other areas of
regulation as well.
Part II of the article describes the many visible and less visible barriers
to international trade and competition that may be encountered by foreign
suppliers, and that result from national laws, regulations, administrative
rules and practices in the area of government purchasing.
In Part III the discussion turns to the relevant rules of the GATT-
MTN system. Although the GATT itself does not seek to regulate national
government purchasing activity, one of the more significant results of the
Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations was the conclusion of an
Agreement on Government Procurement, which entered into force on Janu-
ary 1, 1981. In November 1983 the Committee on Government Procure-
ment (composed of representatives from each of the Parties to the Agree-
ment) initiated negotiations with a view to improving the Agreement and
expanding the coverage.
This attempt, at the more general international level, to remove barri-
ers to international trade in the field of government purchasing, was pre-
ceded by measures taken at the regional level within the European Commu-
nity. Part IV of the paper therefore describes the structure of legal
regulation for public supply contracts within the EEC prior to implementa-
tion of the MTN Agreement in the Community legal system. The discus-
sion then considers the problems which arose in connection with that imple-
mentation, both with regard to the impact of the Agreement on the pre-
existing legal regime as well as the method chosen to give effect to the
Agreement in the Community legal system.
Part V focuses more closely on certain institutional and structural dif-
ferences between the two systems. It compares the respective "interna-
tional" dispute settlement and enforcement procedures, and examines the
possibility for private individuals to invoke rights under the international
rules directly before national courts, in a private dispute with the national
authorities. Such an evaluation of the comparative effectiveness of these
mechanisms may assist in assessing the degree of likely compliance with,
and effectiveness of, the rules of the system in general and the rules on
government procurement in particular.
concluded with foreign suppliers; in 1980 the figure was 3%.
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I. DEFINITION OF CONTEXT-SOME CONTRASTS BETWEEN THE GATT-
MTN SYSTEM AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
The problem of barriers to trade in the area of public supply contracts
has been faced both within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and the European Community. An appreciation of the differences
between the two systems may be helpful in providing a context for evaluat-
ing the significance and impact of the solutions attempted.
The GATT is a multilateral trade agreement, concluded in 1947, with
90 signatory contracting parties." Most of the MTN agreements that re-
sulted from the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations are also
multilateral agreements, each one binding a varying number of signatories
and dealing with a specific aspect or sector of trade liberalization. 5 Because
4. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. The current version of GATT is contained in
IV GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED Doc-
UMENTS (1969). The text of the GATT is reproduced in J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra
note 2, DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT 1-72 (1976).
On the GATT generally, see J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF THE GATT
(1969) [hereinafter cited as J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE]; K. DAM, supra note 3.
In the interest of accuracy, it should be pointed out that the GATT is not applied defini-
tively as such, but is instead applied through a Protocol of Provisional Application. See J.
JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 2, at 398, 401-05, and J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE, at
60-66.
For a list of 88 of the contracting parties to the GATT, as well as the one country which
has acceded provisionally and three of the six countries which apply the GATT de facto pend-
ing final decision as to their future commercial policy, see E. McGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE REGULATION 45-46 (1982). The Maldives and Belize became the 89th and 90th con-
tracting parties in 1983. See Maldives Latest Member of GATT, GAT Focus No. 21, April-
May 1983, at 4; Belize 90th Member of GATT, GATT FOCUS No. 25, October-November
1983, at 4.
5. The GATT has sponsored seven rounds of multilateral trade negotiations. Six earlier
rounds of multilateral trade negotiations had resulted in a progressive reduction of tariff barri-
ers. In addition, during the sixth round (known as the Kennedy Round, 1962-67) two agree-
ments on NTBs (non-tariff barriers) were concluded - an agreement on anti-dumping duties
and an agreement on the American Selling Price (ASP) method of valuing certain goods for
customs purposes. The attempted implementation of these agreements into United States Law
ran into considerable difficulties; see J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 2, at 145.
In addition to the Agreement on Government Procurement, the Tokyo Round of Multilat-
eral Trade Negotiations (1973-79), resulted in the conclusion of several other Agreements and
Understandings (the MTN Agreements): (i) agreements on tariff reductions, subsidies and
countervailing duties, anti-dumping, standards, customs valuation, import licensing, trade in
civil aircraft, dairy products, bovine meat; (ii) a number of Understandings resulting from the
work of the "Group Framework" relating to developing countries, balance of payments mea-
sures, safeguard actions for development purposes-notification, consultation and settlement of
disputes.
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of the difficulty of amending the GATT itself,' the MTN non-tariff barrier
agreements are technically "side agreements" to the GATT and may be
viewed as creating separate "sub-systems." 7
The European Community, on the other hand, is a regional organiza-
tion, created by three treaties, the most important of which is the Treaty of
Rome of 1957 creating the European Economic Community (EEC). The
European Community currently includes ten West European countries as
its Member States.'
A. Contrasts Between the GATT-MTN System and the European
Community
Although the European Community was created by a number of inter-
national treaties, its unique and particularly intensive form of international
cooperation and integration represents a radical departure from more con-
See "Agreements Reached in the Tokyo Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations,"
U.S.T. reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96 Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1979). The text of the
Agreement on Government Procurement, GATT Doc. No. MTN/NTM/W/211, [hereinafter
cited as the Agreement is reproduced in 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1052 (1979).
For a survey of these MTN Agreements, see Jackson, Louis & Matsushita, Implementing
the Tokyo Round: Legal Aspects of Changing International Economic Rules, 81 MICH. L.
REv. 267, 271-77 (1982). For a status report on the number of countries accepting the various
Codes as of October 1983, see the report in Nonmarket Economy, Developing Countries
Among Those Signing GATT Trade Codes, 20 INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY
(BNA) 101, 112-14 (October 18, 1983).
6. Indeed it is generally considered almost impossible to amend the GATT nowadays
(except for technical amendments resulting from tariff concessions). See J. JACKSON, LEGAL
PROBLEMS, supra note 2, at 402; Jackson, The Birth of the GA TT-MTN Systenv A Constitu-
tional Appraisal, 12 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 21, 32 (1980).
7. The exact relationship of these MTN "side agreements" to the GATT is unclear. See
Jackson, Louis & Matsushita, supra note 5, at 272. It should be noted, however, that the
Agreement on Government Procurement, unlike some of the other NTB agreements, does not
purport to be an "agreed interpretation" of various articles of the GATT.
8. Thus the European Community in fact consists of three Communities, established by
three separate Treaties: (1) the European Coal and Steel Community, established by the
Treaty of Paris of April 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140; (2) the European Economic Community,
established by the Treaty of Rome of March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3; (3) the European
Atomic Energy Community, established by another Treaty of Rome, also of March 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 259. The text of these treaties is reproduced in E. STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAEL-
BROECK, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN PERSPECTIVE (1976), Docu-
MENTS SUPPLEMENT 1-39, 40-86, 206-43 respectively (1976). Where detailed consideration of
the Community is called for, the discussion will be confined to describing the EEC.
9. The six original Member States of the European Community were Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands (the three Benelux countries), France, Italy, and West Germany. Den-
mark, Ireland and the United Kingdom acceded to the Community on January 1, 1973 and
Greece acceded on January 1, 1981. Spain and Portugal are currently negotiating to join.
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ventional forms of international regime, such as the GATT and the MTN
Agreements. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note two vital differ-
ences that distinguish the European Community from the GATT-MTN
system of international economic regulation. These differences concern
objectives and scope, and institutional structure.
1. Objectives and Scope of Matters Covered
The GATT-MTN system pursues the limited objective of removing
barriers to trade in goods, 10 albeit within a wide grouping of countries. The
EEC Treaty, on the other hand, pursues much more ambitious goals, em-
10. In addition to obligations resulting from the tariff commitments made by the con-
tracting parties (embodied in Article 11 and incorporated schedules), the GATT, supra note 4,
also contains an MFN obligation (Article I) and a number of rules of conduct regulating non-
tariff barriers to trade (Part II of the GATT, Articles III-XXI).
For an outline of the GATT, see J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 2, at 399-401.
The limited objectives of the GATT are clear from the recitals in the Preamble, which
states that the governments of the contracting parties:
[Recognizing] that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be
conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a
large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, developing the
full use of the resources of the world and expanding the production and exchange of
goods; [Being] desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and
mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and
other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international
commerce.
Compare the fifth recital of the Preamble to the Agreement on Government Procurement,
which states that the Parties to the Agreement:
[Recognizing] the need to establish an agreed international framework of rights and obli-
gations with respect to laws, regulations, procedures and practices regarding government
procurement with a view to achieving greater liberalization and expansion of world trade
and improving the international framework for the conduct of world trade.
It should be noted, however, that consideration is now being given to a possible new round
of negotiations within GATT in 1986, which would include subjects outside the traditional
GATT-MTN ambit, such as trade in services and investment. See Compromise GATT Accord
Adopted, Though Differences Remain on Agricultural Trade, 18 INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. Ex-
PORT WEEKLY (BNA) 311 (November 11, 1982), and the text of the communique issued after
the GATT ministerial meeting, id. 362 at 367; U.S. Completes Its Study of Services Trade,
Hoping for Another GATT Round, 20 INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 493
(January 3, 1984); Informal Meeting on Proposals to GATT Produces Varying Degrees of
Enthusiasm, 20 INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 755 (March 13, 1984);
OECD Ministerial Meeting Focuses on Trade Problems, Support For New Round of MTN,
20 INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 968 (MAY 22, 1984); Economic Summit
Produces 10-Point Program But No Agreement on New MTN Round at GATT, 20 INT'L
TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 1046 (June 12, 1984); Britain Joins U.S., Canada
in Calling For Inclusion of Services in GATT MTN, I INT'L TRADE REP. CURRENT REPORTS
(BNA) 20 (July 4, 1984).
19841
58 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE
bracing an extremely wide range of economic activities,1" with a view to
creating a common market, and eventually a full economic and monetary
union 2 between its ten Member States.
The creation of the "common market" is achieved essentially by laying
down two main kinds of rules. The first are those rules abolishing the re-
strictions imposed by the Member States, not only on the free movement of
goods but also the factors of production (labor, capital and enterprise).
Other policies and rules are designed to supplement these "four freedoms,"
such as rules on competition, approximation of laws, common commercial
policy, and special legal regimes for transport and agriculture.1 3
1I. Article 3 of the EEC Treaty enumerates the various activities of the EEC:
For the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of the Community shall include, as
provided in this Treaty and in accordance with the timetable set out therein
(a) the elimination, as between Member States, of customs duties and of quantita-
tive restrictions on the import and export of goods, and of all other measures having
equivalent effect;
(b) the establishment of a common customs tariff and of a common commercial
policy towards third countries;
(c) the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to freedom of movement
for persons, services and capital;
(d) the adoption of a common policy in the sphere of agriculture;
(e) the adoption of a common policy in the sphere of transport;
(f) the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the common market is not
distorted;
(g) the application of procedures by which the economic policies of Member States
can be coordinated and disequilibria in their balances of payments remedied;
(h) the approximation of the laws of Member States to the extent required for the
proper functioning of the common market;
(i) the creation of a European Social Fund in order to improve employment opportu-
nities for workers and to contribute to the raising of their standard of living;
(j) the establishment of a European Investment Bank to facilitate the economic ex-
pansion of the Community by opening up fresh resources;
(k) the association of the overseas countries and territories in order to increase trade
and to promote jointly economic and social development.
12. See Article 2 of the EEC Treaty, which states that:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and pro-
gressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote throughout
the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and bal-
anced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelereated raising of the standard of living
and closer relations between the States belonging to it.
13. F.R. Root describes the place of the EEC on what may be termed a "continuum of
economic integration," in the following terms:
A free trade area is established when a group of countries abolishes restrictions on mu-
tual trade but each member country retains its own tariff and quota system on trade with
third countries. An industrial free trade area covers only trade in industrial products
while a full free trade area includes all products. As an industrial free trade area, the
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) represents only a modest form of economic
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2. Institutional Structure and System of Legal Regulation
The institutional structure of the GATT-MTN system is deficient in its
integration.
A customs union is created when a group of countries removes all restrictions on
mutual trade and also sets up a common system of tariffs and quotas with respect to third
countries.
A customs union becomes a common market with the removal of all restrictions on
the movement of productive factors-labor, capital, and enterprise. The EEC is now in
this state of evolution and is proceeding toward an economic union.
The completion of the final stage of economic union involves a full integration of the
member economies with supranational authorities responsible for economic policy mak-
ing. In particular, an economic union requires a single monetary system and central bank,
a unified fiscal system, and a common foreign economic policy. The task of creating an
economic union differs significantly from the steps necessary to establish the less amibi-
tious forms of economic integration. A free trade area, a customs union, or a common
market mainly result from the abolition of restrictions, whereas an economic union de-
mands a positive agreement to transfer economic sovereignty to new supranational
institutions.
See F.R. ROOT, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT-THEORY, POLICY, ENTERPRISE
378-79 (1973), extracted in E. STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAELBROECK, supra note 8, at 364-65.
The EEC is a "customs union" within the meaning of Article XXIV(8)(a) of the GATT,
which in effect exempts the members of a customs union from their MFN obligations towards
non-member contracting parties to the GATT.
Article XXIV(8)(a) provides that:
A customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution of a single customs terri-
tory for two or more customs territories, so that:
(i) duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where necessary,
those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated with
respect to substantially all the trade between the constituent territories of the union or at
least with respect to substantially all the trade in products originating in such territories,
and
(ii) subject to the provisions of paragraph 9, substantially the same duties and other
regulations of commerce are applied by each of the members of the union to the trade of
territorities not included in the union.
The following potential economic effects of a customs union have been noted:
(i) viewed from the perspective of the world trading system, a customs union may
have both positive trade creating and negative trade diverting effects. Trade creation re-
sults because, within the union, resources are shifted from a high cost production point to
a lower cost production point. On the other hand, trade diversion results when the union
causes a shift of resources from more efficient producers outside the union to less efficient
producers within the union.
(ii) in addition, extending the market within which firms can operate may also have
certain other, more controversial dynamic effects on the members' level of economic ac-
tivities, e.g., because of the increased opportunity to take advantage of economies of
scale, the tendency towards larger firms able to finance the research and development for
product innovation, stimulation of competition, etc.
(iii) the larger economic unit has greater bargaining power in dealing with third
1984]
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lack of developed institutional mechanisms for rule formulation and dispute
resolution. This deficiency results in increased risks of non-compliance with
its rules and difficulties of effective enforcement. 4
By contrast, the EEC is characterized by the endowment of sovereign
powers, both legislative and judicial, upon a number of central Community
institutions. 1 This highly developed institutional structure facilitates both
countries and may thus exercise greater leverage in allocating the gains from trade.
E. STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAELBROECK, supra note 8, at 366-68.
Article XXIV of the GATT seems to be based on the assumption that the positive trade
creation effects of a customs union (or free trade area) will outweigh the negative trade divert-
ing effects. See E. STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAELBROECK, supra note 8, at 368. Article XXIV(4)
of the GATT states that:
The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the
development, through voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the economies
of the countries parties to such agreements. They also recognize that the purpose of a
customs union or of a free trade area should be to facilitate trade between the constituent
territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of other contracting parties with such
territories.
14. The institutional structure of the GATT is described in J. JACKSON, LEGAL
PROBLEMS, supra note 2, Chapter 7, esp. 410-30.
Professor Jackson has analyzed the deficiencies and weaknesses in the institutional struc-
ture of the GATT-MTN system, in Jackson, supra note 6.
The particular problem of dispute settlement, compliance and enforcement is discussed
further infra notes 144-198 and accompanying text, in the twin contexts of the Agreement on
Government Procurement and the European Community.
15. See Article 4 of the EEC Treaty.
Very generally, the principal decision-making and legislative power resides with the inter-
governmental Council of Ministers, (EEC Treaty, Articles 145 et seq.), which generally can-
not act, however, without a proposal from the Commission, which possesses the "power of
initiative" and is also the executive arm of the Community. The Commission is an independent
body which acts in the general interest of the Community as a whole (Article 155 of the EEC
Treaty, Article 10 of the Merger Treaty. The Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a
Single Commission of the European Communities, April 8, 1965 (Merger Treaty) is repro-
duced in E. STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAELBROECK, DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 8, at
245-50.)
Moreover, in many cases the Council must consult the Assembly of the European Com-
munities ("European Parliament") (EEC Treaty Articles 137 et seq.) and the Economic and
Social Committee (EEC Treaty Articles 193 et seq.), for an advisory opinion, before it takes
any final decision.
Article 189 of the EEC Treaty enumerates three basic forms of binding act-regulations,
directives and decisions. The text of Article 189 of the EEC Treaty reads as follows:
In order to carry out their task the Council and the Commission shall, in accordance
with the provisions of this Treaty, make regulations, issue directives, take decisions, make
recommendations or deliver opinions.
A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and
directly applicable in all Member States.
A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member
[Vol. 8
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
effective rule formulation and dispute resolution, with resulting gains in in-
creased compliance with the rules of the system and more effective enforce-
ment." In exercising these sovereign powers, the Community institutions
not only regulate the community of Member States but also govern the
activities of private individuals within the Community. 7 In the view of the
Court of Justice, this endowment of sovereign powers is the result of a
transfer of powers from the Member States to the Community, which en-
tails "a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights.""8
State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of
form and methods.
A decision shall be binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is addressed.
Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force.
The task of the Court of Justice is to "ensure that in the interpretation and application of
this Treaty the law is observed" (Article 164 of the EEC Treaty). The main heads of its
jurisdiction may be classified as follows:
(a) original jurisdiction to resolve disputes arising on the Community ("international")
plane, in actions by Member States or relevant Community institutions for: (1) failure by a
Member State to fulfill its obligations under the Treaty (Articles 169 and 170); (2) annulment
of acts of the Council and the Commission other than recommendations or opinions (Article
173); (3) unlawful failure to act by the Council or the Commission (Article 175). Under Arti-
cle 219 the EEC Member States agree to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to
resolve disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the Treaty.
(b) original jurisdiction in cases where private individuals challenge unlawful Community
activity by the Community institutions, in actions for: (1) annulment (Article 173); (2) failure
to act (Article 175); (3) damages (Articles 178 and 215).
(c) jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings, in particular on the interpretation of the
Treaty and the validity and interpretation of acts of the Community institutions, following a
reference by a national court (Article 177).
16. See further infra notes 164-67, 181-98 and accompanying text.
17. In Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Comm'n, 1963 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, the Court described the essential features of this veritable "Community
Constitution" in the following terms (at 12, emphasis added):
The objective of the EEC Treaty, which is to establish a Common Market, the function-
ing of which is of direct concern to interested parties in the Community, implies that this
Treaty is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between the
contracting states. This view is confirmed by the preamble to the Treaty which refers not
only to governments but to peoples. It is also confirmed more specifically by the establish-
ment of institutions endowed with sovereign rights, the exercise of which affects Member
States and also their citizens. Furthermore, it must be noted that the nationals of the
states brought together in the Community are called upon to cooperate in the functioning
of this Community through the intermediary of the European Parliament and the Eco-
nomic and Social Committee.
18. In other words, a new polity has resulted from a re-ordering of the "inward-looking"
governmental powers of the "sovereign" over its traditional subjects, the private individual, in
addition to a limitation of that outward-looking "sovereignty" of the state as a member of the
international community of states.
This transfer of sovereign powers, with its attendant limitation upon Member State sover-
1984]
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One consequence of this structural difference between the Community
and the GATT-MTN system is that, in contrast to the latter, the Commu-
nity possesses an autonomous and effective legal system which has become
an integral part of the legal systems of the Member States. 9
B. A Tri-Level Comparison
These observations suggest that the EEC may be compared and con-
trasted, not only with the GATT-MTN system but also with the federal
system of the United States. On the one hand, all three systems must solve
similar problems in pursuing the objective of removing barriers to trade in
goods. On the other hand, the existence of a "supranational" governmental
structure and legal system embracing an extremely wide range of economic
activities brings the European Community system much closer to the U.S.
federal system," which presents analogous problems (and possible solu-
eignty, was noted by the Court in Van Gend en Loos, at 12:
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the Community constitutes a new legal
order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign
rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member
States but also their nationals.
It was confirmed one year later in Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
585, 593 (emphasis added).
By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own personality, its own legal
capacity and capacity of representation on the international plane and, more particularly,
real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the
States to the Community, the Member States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit
within a limited field, and have thus created a body of law which binds both their nation-
als and themselves.
The Court continued in a later passage (at 594): "The transfer by the States from their
domestic legal system to the Community legal system of the rights and obligations arising
under the Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights ... "
19. See Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL, at 593, where the Court of Justice claimed:
By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty has created its own
legal system which, on the entry into force of the Treaty, became an integral part of the
legal systems of the Member States and which their courts are bound to apply.
The present writer has undertaken a jurisprudential analysis of the legal nature of the
European Community, using H.L.A. Hart's model of law and a legal system which, it is ar-
gued, illustrates, explains and supports this ambitious claim from the viewpoint of legal theory.
See Jones, The Legal Nature of the European Community: A Jurisprudential Analysis Using
H.L.A. Hart's Model of Law and A Legal System, 17 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (1984).
20. As Professor Jackson has observed, however, the solutions which the Community has
found to the various problems involved in attempting to create a common market and eventual
economic and monetary union may shed light on possible solutions to analogous problems
which arise in a wider international context, whether as part of the GATT-MTN system of
regulation or in the context of other initiatives at the international level. See J. JACKSON,
LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 2, at 280.
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tions) both with regard to substantive regulation in a "common market" as
well as the distribution of powers between central and subordinate units of
government."'
II. THE PROBLEM DESCRIBED: NATIONAL LAWS, REGULATIONS,
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES AND PRACTICES IN THE FIELD OF GOVERNMENT
PROCUREMENT
There exists a great variety of national laws, regulations, administra-
tive rules and practices which discriminate against or disadvantage foreign
suppliers who may wish to compete for government supply contracts. Any
attempt to liberalize international trade and increase competition in this
21. For an interesting and illuminating comparison of the formal structure of the Euro-
pean Community system with that of the U.S. federal system, see Bridge, American Ana-
logues in the Law of the European Community, II ANGLO-AMERICAN L. REV. 130 (1982).
Two very important studies have recently been published, comparing the European Com-
munity with the United States federal system:
Jackson, Louis & Matsushita, supra note 5, where the authors undertake a comparative
study which examines the relationship of the constitutional systems of the EEC, the United
States and Japan, to the processes of negotiating, concluding and implementing international
agreements, in particular the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Agreements.
COURTS AND FREE MARKETS (T. Sandalow & E. Stein, eds. 1982). This work consists of
a series of papers, undertaking a comparative study of the contribution made by the Supreme
Court and the Court of Justice in maintaining a continental wide "common market" in the
United States and in the European Community.
In their introductory essay, the two editors observe that there are a number of crucial
similarities between the two systems:
(1) a similarity of problems resulting from the division of governmental power between
central and local ("state") authorities;
(2) a similarity of objectives, which the authors describe in the following terms (at p.
3):
• . . [B]oth the Constitution and the EEC Treaty superimposed central institutional
frameworks upon existing state structures with the objective of forming "a mmore
perfect union." To be sure, the Constitution was intended to establish a nation,
while the immediate purpose of the Treaty was limited to economic objectives, in-
cluding a customs union and a "common market." But it is also true that, in the
United States, a central reason for establishing the nation was to promote a "com-
mon market"; and among the animating impulses for creating the European com-
mon market was the vision of an economic and political union as the culmination of
the integration movement;
(3) a similarity of means, in that each system has relied heavily upon courts to achieve
their objectives.
However, as the editors caution at 4-9, it is important not to lose sight of certain
essential differences between the two systems. The two systems differ not only in terms of
their historical origin as well as the differing social and cultural conditions, but also in
the quantum of powers conferred on their central institutions. These differences are re-
flected, moreover, in differing designs of the central institutions.
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area must therefore address not only the more visible forms of discrimina-
tion, but also the many less visible ways in which foreign suppliers may be
discriminated against or disadvantaged in the operation of the government
procurement procedures themselves.
A. Visible, Open Discrimination Controlling the Procurement Decision
Discrimination against foreign suppliers may take a very visible form.
National government purchasing laws or regulations may openly control the
procurement decision itself and mandate discrimination by, for example,
imposing a total or partial prohibition on the purchase of imported prod-
ucts, or by requiring that products from domestic suppliers be granted a
preference."
B. Less Visible Forms of Discrimination or Disadvantage Resulting
From the Operation of the Government Procurement Procedures
Foreign suppliers may also be discriminated against or disadvantaged
in many less visible ways, at any of the various different stages in the pro-
curement process."1
22. Such open, statutory discrimination is the approach adopted in the United States'
"Buy American Act," 41 U.S.C. §10a-10d (1933). See also infra note 58.
23. The various practices engaged in are discussed generally in K. DAM, supra note 3, at
202-05; Horsch, Eliminating Non-tarff Barriers to International Trade: The MTN Agree-
ment on Government Procurement, N.Y.U. J. INr'L L. & POL., 315, 325-33 (1979); Peterson,
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979: The Agreement on Government Procurement, 14 . INT'L
L. & ECON, 321, 323-24, 344-45 (1980); Kono, United States-Japan Trade Developments
Under the MTN Agreement on Government Procurement, 5 FOILDHAM INT'L LAW J., 139,
150-151, 155-80 (1981). With regard to Japan, for example, Kono concludes that:
Japan's government procurement practices and procedures have resulted in the uninten-
tional, systemic exclusion of foreign competition. Logistical obstruction to foreign entry
can be found in the decentralized procurement system, nominal publicity requirements,
the short period in which to respond to government procurement proposals, and the lack
of open bidding. This system perpetuates an inherent bias in favor of domestic suppliers.
To some degree, Japan's exclusion of foreign suppliers has also been a matter of choice.
Either under "administrative guidance" or because of personal, nationalistic, nepotistic or
complacent tendencies, procurement officials have exercised their discretion to prevent
foreign access in government procurement.
Kono, id. at 159-60.
As far as the Member States of the European Community are concerned, it should be
remembered that some of the measures taken to remove barriers to intra-Community trade in
the area of government purchasing, may also incidentally benefit suppliers from third countries
in any event, e.g., obligation to publicize government purchasing opportunities. These measures
are discussed infra notes 92-109 and accompanying text. Compare Bourgeois supra note 3, at
16, where the author discusses the effect on non-signatories of compliance with the rules of the
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1. Invitation to Participate
Certain practices may effectively ensure that a foreign supplier is never
invited to participate in the tendering procedures in the first place. Such
practices depend upon the type of tendering procedures used.
Open (or public) tendering, under which all interested suppliers are in-
vited to submit a bid, is the least restrictive type of tendering procedure.
However, it also appears to be the least frequently utilized procedure."
Even where it is used, the notice of tender (which constitutes an invitation
to bid) may be inadequately publicized by being placed, for example, in a
publication of such limited circulation that it is unlikely to reach foreign
suppliers."5
If a selective tendering procedure is followed, the purchasing authority
only invites certain suppliers to submit a bid. Selective tendering may take
one of two forms. The more usual form of selective tendering involves the
use of pre-established lists of qualified suppliers. This method may discrimi-
nate against foreign suppliers in that suppliers who are not on the pre-es-
tablished lists will not be invited to bid, and not every supplier who is on the
list will necessarily be invited to bid for a particular purchase. Moreover,
the criteria for admission to the list may be vague or even clearly discrimi-
natory."" In addition, listing and delisting may lie in the ultimate discretion
of the purchasing authority. In Japan, for example, "families" of firms with
long-established ties with government agencies have traditionally often been
the only firms on the lists, thus excluding not only foreign suppliers but also
other Japanese suppliers. One example is the "Den Den Family," a group
of Japanese manufacturers who traditionally received the bulk of contracts
for NTT (Nippon Telephone and Telegraph Public Corporation)."7
In the second form of selective tendering, suppliers submit an applica-
tion to be invited to bid for the particular purchase in question. In this case,
the purchasing authority's decision to invite certain suppliers to bid may be
made in a discriminatory fashion.
In both forms of selective tender, a notice of the proposed purchase
may or may not be published. Once again, however, even if it is published,
MTN Agreement on Government Procurement.
24. See, e.g., K. DAM, supra note 3, at 203. Apart from their discriminatory effect, there
are other reasons why a purchasing authority may prefer to utilize a selective or single tender-
ing procedure, e.g., public tendering can be more costly and administratively cumbersome.
See. e.g., Horsch, supra note 23, at 335.
25. See, e.g., K. DAM, supra note 3, at 203; Horsch, supra note 23, at 327.
26. The general problem of qualifying as an eligible supplier is discussed further infra
note 28 and accompanying text.
27. See Kono, supra note 23, at 158.
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the publication in which it is placed may be of such limited circulation that
it is unlikely to reach foreign suppliers.
The single tendering procedure is an extreme version of selective
tendering. Under this procedure the purchasing authority contacts only one
supplier, with whom the authority then negotiates the terms of the proposed
purchase.
2. Obstacles Preventing Foreign Suppliers From Submitting a Responsive
Bid
Even if a foreign supplier is invited to participate in the tendering pro-
cedures, he may nevertheless encounter a number of obstacles in practice,
which effectively prevent him from submitting a responsive bid.
Information. The notice of the proposed purchase may contain inade-
quate information on such essential matters as the products to be pur-
chased, time limits, addresses, or specifications and requirements that must
be satisfied by the product. Domestic suppliers with a close working rela-
tionship with the purchasing authority may have easy access to the neces-
sary information, which the foreign supplier may experience difficulty in
obtaining.
Time limits. The time period between the notice of tender and the
deadline for submission of a bid may be too short to enable the foreign
supplier to respond in time. Moreover, domestic suppliers, who are nearer to
the scene and more often have a closer working relationship with the
purchasing authority, are more likely to have advance knowledge of any
forthcoming tender announcements.
Qualification as an eligible supplier. Conditions which a supplier must
satisfy in order to qualify as an eligible supplier 8 may discriminate against
or disadvantage foreign suppliers, either by imposing more stringent re-
quirements for foreign suppliers or by being more difficult for foreign sup-
pliers to meet in practice. Examples would include requirements concerning
residence, registration, local representation, financial guarantees or evidence
of ability to perform the contract. Moreover, the procedures for qualifying
suppliers may be used in a discriminatory manner, such as dilatory process-
ing in the case of foreign suppliers.
Technical specifications. Technical requirements that must be satisfied
by the product may be framed in such a manner that they can only (or can
more easily) be satisfied by a domestic product. Indeed, as was pointed out
28. Difficulties in qualifying as an eligible supplier may be encountered in public tender-
ing procedures, as well as selective tendering procedures (e.g., in qualifying for inclusion on a
pre-established list).
[Vol. 8
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
in a report by the U.S. Tariff Commission (now International Trade Com-
mission), "purchasing authorities may specify technical requirements in ad-
vance collaboration with domestic suppliers, thereby limiting from the out-
set the possible competitiveness of the foreign bidder."'
3. Submission, Receipt and Opening of Tenders; Evaluation of Tenders
and Award of Contracts
A foreign supplier who is able to submit a responsive bid may never-
theless still encounter various other difficulties. The conditions under which
bids may be submitted and received may operate in favor of domestic sup-
pliers. Domestic suppliers, for example, may be permitted greater latitude
in altering the terms of their bids, or receipt of a foreign supplier's bid at
the correct destination may be delayed. Moreover, the purchasing authority
may be permitted to open bids in secret, which presents a further opportu-
nity for discrimination against foreign suppliers. Finally, the criteria for
evaluating bids once they are submitted and received, and awarding con-
tracts may be sufficiently vague to permit substantial discrimination in
favor of domestic suppliers."
4. Information and Review
A dissatisfied foreign supplier may encounter difficulties in obtaining
redress for any grievance he may have, because the purchasing authority
may refuse to furnish relevant information or reasons for its decision, and
because procedures for reviewing a purchasing authority's decision may be
inadequate or even nonexistent.8
29. Horsch, supra note 23, at 327 n.73 (quoting TARIFF COMMISSION, TARIFFS, NON-
TARIFF TRADE BARRIERS AND TRADE AGREEMENTS, U.S. AND WORLD 67 (1974)).
30. According to Dam, "The most effective method for discriminating against foreign
suppliers is the vesting of discretion in procurement officials to select among bidders on the
basis of criteria other than price." See K. DAM, supra note 3, at 204.
31. As is clear from the preceding discussion, foreign suppliers may be discriminated
against or disadvantaged in a great variety of ways. Although the discussion has been primar-
ily chronological, i.e., an examination of the various obstacles that may be encountered at the
different stages in the procurement process, it is also possible to analyze these laws, regula-
tions, etc., according to the different type of discrimination or disadvantage which they
occasion.
It may be helpful at the outset to make a basic distinction between what may be termed
"formal differentiation" and "material differentiation." In the former case, the measure in
question makes a formal distinction between the domestic and foreign suppliers or products. In
the latter case, on the other hand, the measures made no such formal distinction but the law,
regulation, practice, etc. bears more heavily on, and thereby disadvantages, foreign suppliers or
products. The terms "formal differentiation" and "material differentiation" are used by Wyatt
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III. GATT-MTN REGULATION OF NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT ACTIVITY
The rules of the GATT that are relevant to government procurement
do not seek to control discriminatory practices in government procurement.
Article III of the GATT contains the basic obligation of national treatment,
i.e., an obligation of non-discrimination as between domestically produced
products and products of other contracting parties with respect to matters
of internal taxation and internal national regulation. 2 Article III(8)(a),
however, expressly exempts government purchases from the national treat-
ment obligation of Article III, at least in the case of "products purchased
and Dashwood in D. WYATT & A. DASHWOOD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EEC Ch. 10
(1980), see especially 99-102. Formal differentiation will normally involve purposeful discrimi-
nation, while material differentiation may or may not be the result of purposeful
discrimination.
Visible, open discrimination in the procurement decision itself mandated by government
purchasing laws or regulations is clearly a type of formal, purposeful differentiation. The oper-
ation of the government purchasing procedures themselves, however, may result in either for-
mal or material differentiation and, in either case, may involve the application of general laws,
regulations, administrative rules or practices, or simply particular decisions taken in individual
cases (in the exercise of a permitted discretion, for example).
Among the reasons frequently given for purposeful discrimination are the following: (1)
various economic concerns, e.g., improvement in the balance of payments, protection of domes-
tic industry; (2) political pressures, e.g., from special interest groups in the business and labor
sectors; (3) national security concerns, i.e., the desire to protect and develop industries that
may be needed in time of war; (4) various practical factors, e.g., lack of uniformity in specifi-
cations; language barriers; familiarity and case of dealing with local suppliers; availability of
service, maintenance and repair parts; availability of legal recourse in case of default.
For further discussion of the motives underlying discriminatory procurement practices, see
K. DAM, supra note 3, at 200-02; Peterson, supra note 23, at 323-25.
32. Of particular relevance in the present context are paragraphs (1) and (4) of Article
IlL.
Article 111(1) states generally that:
The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges, and
laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase,
transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative regulations re-
quiring the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions,
should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to do-
mestic production.
More particularly, with regard to internal national regulations, Article 111(4) provides that:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any
other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded
to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements
affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or
use. . ..
For a general discussion of the national treatment obligation, see J. JACKSON, LEGAL
PROBLEMS, supra note 2, at Ch. 10; J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE, supra note 4, at Ch. 12.
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for governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with
a view to use in the production of goods for commercial sale."38 Such gov-
ernment purchases probably also fall outside the scope of the MFN obliga-
tion in Article I,s" by virtue of the particular wording of the two Articles."
Moreover, Article XVII(2) of the GATT also contains an exception for
government procurement by state enterprises from any obligation which
may be imposed on such state enterprises under Article XVII(1).soThis la-
33. The full text of Article III(8)(a) reads as follows:
The provisions of this Article shall not apply to laws, regulations or requirements gov-
erning the procurement by governmental agencies of products purchased for governmen-
tal purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the produc-
tion of goods for commercial sale.
For an example of a U.S. case where the exception was held not to apply, see Baldwin-
Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. App. 2d 803, 25 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1962),
extracted in J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 2, at 612. In that case the court held
that the California Buy American statute was unenforceable in the case of a proposed city
purchase of certain tubes and other equipment. Application of the statute to the proposed
purchase would conflict with the GATT and did not fall within the government procurement
exception since the equipment was for use in the generation of electric power for resale and
thus "for use in the production of goods for sale."
In addition, Article III(8)(b) provides that:
The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the payment of subsidies exclusively to
domestic producers, including payments to domestic producers derived from the proceeds
of internal taxes or charges applied consistently with the provisions of this Article and
subsidies effected through governmental purchases of domestic products.
34. The full text of Article I(l) reads as follows:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with
importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for im-
ports or exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and
with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation,
and with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any
advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product
originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and un-
conditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other
contracting parties.
35. The argument is that government procurement falling within Article III(8)(a) is not
one of the "matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III," since Article III(8)(a)
expressly states that Article III does "not apply" to such procurement. See J. JACKSON, LEGAL
PROBLEMS, supra note 2, at 606.
Article 111(2) does not deal with internal regulations but with internal taxes and charges.
36. Article XVII(1)(a) provides that:
Each contracting party undertakes that if it establishes or maintains a State enterprise,
wherever located, or grants to any enterprise, formally or in effect, exclusive or special
privileges, such enterprise shall, in its purchases or sales involving either imports or ex-
ports, act in a manner consistent with the general principles of nondiscriminatory treat-
ment prescribed in this Agreement for governmental measures affecting imports or ex-
ports by private traders.
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cuna in the GATT has to some extent been remedied by the MTN Agree-
ment on Government Procurement,87 which was concluded as part of the
Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations," and which entered into
force on January 1, 1981.89 In evaluating the extent to which the Agree-
ment seeks to regulate the various national laws, regulations, administrative
rules and practices in the area of government procurement, it is first neces-
sary to examine its limited application, scope and coverage, before consider-
ing the substantive provisions which are directed at the removal of discrimi-
nation or disadvantage for foreign suppliers.
A. Application of the Agreement
By its own terms, the Agreement as such is intended only to apply as
between its Parties.40 A non-signatory GATT contracting party could ar-
It seems that the "nondiscriminatory treatment" referred to means MFN treatment and
not national treatment. "Thus, the enterprise is entitled to discriminate between domestic and
foreign products in its purchases or its sales, as long as it does so on a 'MFN' basis," J.
JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 2, at 1054.
If government procurement by a state enterprise falls within Article XVII (2), the obliga-
tion is even weaker, namely "to accord to the trade of the other contracting parties fair and
equitable treatment." The full text of Article XVII(2) reads as follows:
The provisions of paragraph I of this Article shall not apply to imports or products for
immediate or ultimate consumption in governmental use and not otherwise for resale or
use in the production of goods for sale. With respect to such imports, each contracting
party shall accord to the trade of the other contracting parties fair and equitable
treatment.
37. For a general description of the MTN Agreement on Government Procurement, see
Bourgeois, supra note 3, at 11-19; Horsch, supra note 23, at 333-42; Kono, supra note 23, at
160-66; Peterson, supra note 23, at 329-46; Pomeranz, Toward a New International Order in
Government Procurement, 11 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L BUS., 1263, 1279-93 (1979); Anthony
and Hogerty, Cautious Optimism as a Guide to Foreign Government Procurement, 11 LAW &
POL'Y IN-INT'L Bus., 1301, 1310-34; and Fiaschetti, Technical Analysis of the Government
Procurement Code, 11 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus., at 1345-58.
38. The Tokyo Round of negotiations on government procurement continued the work
which had begun within the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(O.E.C.D.) in the early 1960s. The Tokyo Round initiative was preceded, moreover, by two
attempts to open government procurement markets at the regional level, namely within the
European Community and within the European Free Trade Area (E.F.T.A.). See K. DAM,
supra note 3, at 206-09 and Pomeranz, supra note 37, at 1270-79. The measures taken by the
European Community are discussed infra notes 92-109 and accompanying text.
39. Article IX(3) of the Agreement.
40. As of October, 1983, the Agreement had been accepted by the following: Austria;
Canada; European Economic Community; Finland; Hong Kong; Israel; Japan; Norway; Singa-
pore; Sweden; Switzerland; and United States. A number of other countries have apparently
expressed interest in acceding to the Code. See Focus on Agreement in Government Procure-
ment, GATT Focus No. 23, July-August 1983, at 2; Non-Market Economy, Developing
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guably claim the benefits of the Agreement, however, by virtue of the MFN
obligation in Article I of the GATT. 1 Any such claim may be met by two
arguments. First, since government procurement probably falls outside the
scope of the MFN obligation in Article I altogether, GATT contracting
parties are free to discriminate and grant more favorable treatment to the
products of certain countries, either by unilateral decision or by virtue of an
international agreement.'
Second, even if government procurement is covered by the MFN obli-
gation in Article I, it can be argued that Parties to the Agreement would
only be obligated to extend benefits of the same nature as those granted
directly to other signatories under the Agreement. Since these benefits are
themselves expressly subject to reciprocity, any claim under Article I may
also be subject to a similar condition of reciprocity.' s
B. Scope and Coverage of the Agreement
The impact of the Agreement is restricted not only because non-Parties
are excluded from receiving its benefits, 44 but also by various limitations on
its scope and coverage. As a result, a significant amount of government
purchasing activity may be unaffected by obligations under the Agreement,
Countries Among Those Signing GATT Trade Codes, 20 INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT
WEEKLY (BNA) 101, 112-14 (October 18, 1984).
41. See supra note 34. It is also possible, of course, that a Party to the Agreement may
be bound by an MFN obligation contained in some other international agreement, e.g., a bilat-
eral commercial treaty or a Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) Treaty. See further
on bilateral treaties J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 2, at 363-66.
42. Such as the Agreement on Government Procurement.
43. For further discussion of this issue see Bourgeois, supra note 3, at 15, 16; Hufbauer,
Erb & Starr, The GATT Codes and the Unconditional Most-Favored-Nation Principle, 12
LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus., 59, esp. 88-91 (1980); Rubin, Most Favored Nation Treatment
and the Multilateral Trade Negotiations: A Quiet Revolution, 6 INT'L TRADE L. J. 221; Jack-
son, Equality and Discrimination in International Economic Law (XI): The General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, in Y.B. OF WORLD AFFAIRS 1983, 224, 234 and 238-39.
Even if a non-signatory is not entitled to receive the benefits of the Agreement by virtue
of an MFN obligation, compliance with certain of the obligations under the Agreement will
inevitably be of incidental benefit to all foreign suppliers, e.g., certain publicity requirements.
See further Bourgeois, supra note 3, at 16.
The issue of whether a Party to the Agreement is obligated by an MFN obligation to
extend its benefits to a non-signatory should be distinguished from the MFN obligation which
that Party owes under the Agreement itself to other Parties. Thus, under Article II(l)(b) of
the Agreement, Parties are to accord to the products and suppliers of each other "treatment no
less favourable than . . . that accorded to products and suppliers of any other Party." Article
III of the Agreement provides an exception to this MFN principle, however, in its provisions
for "special and differential treatment for developing countries."
44. Subject to any possible MFN claim.
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and thus significant barriers to trade may remain, even as between Parties
to the Agreement. The exclusions and exceptions which limit the scope and
coverage of the Agreement may be classified as follows:
1. Exclusions Relating to Subject Matter and Value of Contracts
The Agreement covers only the procurement of products. Service con-
tracts per se are expressly excluded, although services incidental to the sup-
ply of products may be covered if their value does not exceed the value of
the products themselves.' Moreover, to be covered by the Agreement, the
procurement contract must have a value at or above the threshold of SDR
150,000.46
45. Article I(l)(a) provides that the Agreement, supra note 5, applies to:
any law, regulation, procedure and practice regarding the procurement of products by the
entities subject to this Agreement. This includes services incidental to the supply of prod-
ucts if the value of these incidental services does not exceed that of the products them-
selves, but not service contracts per Se.
Expansion of the coverage of the Agreement to include service contracts is currently being
studied within the framework of the negotiations initiated in November 1983. See infra note
91 and accompanying text.
46. According to Article I(l)(b) the Agreement, supra note 5, applies to:
any procurement contract of a value of SDR 150,000 or more. No procurement require-
ment shall be divided with the intent of reducing the value of the resulting contracts
below SDR 150,000. If an individual requirement for the procurement of a product of the
same type results in the award of more than one contract or in contracts being awarded
in separate parts, the value of these recurring contracts in the twelve months subsequent
to the initial contract shall be the basis for the application of this Agreement.
SDRs are the International Monetary Fund's international reserve unit of account based
on a basket of currencies of 16 different countries. See "The Trade Agreements Act of 1979:
Statement of Administrative Action," H.R. Doc. No. 153, Part II, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 465
(1979). SDR 150,000 were equivalent to approximately $190,000 at the time the Agreement
was concluded. S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 130, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 381, 516.
Note 2 to Article I provides, however, that:
For contracts below the threshold, the Parties shall consider. . . the application in whole
or in part of this Agreement. In particular, they shall review the procurement practices
and procedures utilized and the application of non-discrimination and transparency for
such contracts in connexion with the possible inclusion of contracts below the threshold in
this Agreement.
This provision of the MTN Agreement specifying the threshold value for coverage of a
procurement contract has led to the first formal reference to the Committee on Government
Procurement and subsequent establishment of a panel under the dispute settlement and en-
forcement procedures of the Agreement. In February 1983, the United States requested that a
panel be established to examine the practice by which Member States of the European Com-
munity exclude value added tax (VAT) from the contract price in determining the threshold
value. The panel found in favor of the United States, which had argued that the value of the
contract should include indirect taxes such as VAT. The Committee on Government Procure-
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2. Exclusions Relating to Purchasing Authorities
Procurement by certain authorities is not covered at all, whatever the
value of the contracts concerned. Since the Agreement applies only to "en-
tities under the direct or substantial control of Parties and other designated
entities,' 47 purchases by regional or local governments are completely ex-
cluded. Furthermore, purchasing by a central government entity is only
covered if that entity is listed in Annex I of the Agreement,'8 and, even in
the case of a listed entity, purchases of certain products may be expressly
ment adopted the Panel Report on May 16, 1984, but apparently declined to issue any recom-
mendation. See Government Procurement, Adoption of Report on VAT, GATT Focus No. 29,
May-June 1984, at 3; see also EC Delays Accepting GATT Panel VAT Report, Manufactur-
ing Clause Trade-off Suggested, 20 INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 728-29
(March 6, 1984); U.S. Effort to Expand GATT Procurement Code Making Progress, But EC
VAT Issue Unresolved, 20 INT'L TRADE RaP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 878-79 (April
14, 1984); GATT Agrees to Accept Report on EC VAT Use in Procurement Despite Protest
by British, 20 INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 924 (May 29, 1984). The
dispute settlement and enforcement procedures under the Agreement are discussed infra, in
Part V. A.
47. Article I(l)(c) of the Agreement, supra note 5.
48. Article l(l)(c) of the Agreement, supra note 5, provides that it applies to:
procurement by the entities under the direct or substantial control of Parties and other
designated entities with respect to their procurement procedures and practices. Until the
review and further negotiations referred to in the Final Provisions, the coverage of this
Agreement is specified by the lists of entities, and to the extent that rectifications, modifi-
cations or amendments may have been made, their successor entities, in Annex I.
Under Article IX(10), the annexes to the Agreement "constitute an integral part
thereof." The original United States' negotiating objective was for all entities "under the di-
rect or substantial control of Parties" to be included under the Agreement. However, some of
the other negotiating partners refused to include in their offers entities in certain important
product sectors, such as telecommunications, power generating and transportation. This re-
sulted in the limited coverage of only those entities listed in Annex I.
By the end of the Tokyo Round the U.S. and Japan had reached reciprocal entity ar-
rangements with all their negotiating partners except each other. The U.S. negotiators insisted
that Japan include NT'T (Nippon Telephone and Telegraph Public Corporation) in its offer,
since it was felt that access to the telecommunications field, in which U.S. suppliers could be
competitive, was necessary to achieve the necessary balance. These negotiations culminated in
the so-called Nf Agreement of December 19, 1980 [Agreement on Procurement in Telecom-
munications, December 19, 1980, United States-Japan, T.I.A.S. No. 99611. For a description
of the NTT Agreement and its impact, see Kono, supra note 23, at 169-182. On January 30,
1984, this Agreement was renewed until December 31, 1986, with certain modifications. See
NTT Pact Extended For Three Years, ABE Holds Trade Talks With U.S. Officials, 20 INT'L
TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 580 (January 31, 1984); U.S. Procurement Op-
portunities in Japan: Renewal of the NTT Agreement, INT'L PROCUREMENT COMMITTEE RE-
PORT (INTERNATIONAL PROCUREMENT COMMITTEE OF THE ABA SECTION OF PUBLIC CON-
TRACT LAW) Vol. 1, No. 3, February 1984, at 1.
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excluded."
3. Exclusion of Purchases for Certain Specific Purposes
Purchases by covered entities for certain specific purposes may be ex-
cluded, either generally under the Agreement itselP ° or in the case of indi-
vidual signatories, as noted in the relevant entity list. The United States in
its list, for example, has expressly excluded "set asides on behalf of small
and minority businesses.""1
4. General Exceptions to the Agreement
Article VIII of the Agreement contains two general exceptions to the
scope and coverage of the Agreement. 2 Under Article VIII(1) of the
Agreement, a Party may take actions "which it considers necessary for the
protection of its essential security interests," with regard to certain types of
procurement." In addition, Article VIII(2) contains certain "police power"
or "public policy" exceptions.5 '
49. Such as, for example, certain purchases by the Department of Defense in the U.S.
entity list.
It should be noted that the Agreement does obligate the The Parties to inform the author-
ities which are not covered of certain matters. Thus Article 1(2) provides that:
The Parties shall inform their entities not covered by this Agreement and the regional
and local governments and authorities within their territories of the objectives, principles
and rules of this Agreement, in particular the rules on national treatment and non-dis-
crimination, and draw their attention to the overall benefits of liberalization of govern-
ment procurement.
50. Thus a General Note to the Agreement provides that:
Having regard to general policy considerations relating to tied aid, including the objective
of developing countries with respect to the untying of such aid, this Agreement does not
apply to procurement made in furtherance of tied aid to developing countries so long as it
is practised by Parties.
51. Annex I to the Agreement; supra note 5.
52. Although the wording and detailed ambit differ, these exceptions are similar in their
general ambit to the exceptions to the GATT contained in Article XXI (security exceptions)
and Article XX (general exceptions).
53. The full text of Article VIII(l) provides that:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent any Party from taking action or
not disclosing any information which it considers necessary for the protection of its essen-
tial security interests relating to the procurement of arms, ammunition or war materials,
or to procurement indispensable for national security or for national defense purposes.
It remains to be seen whether this exception will be abused by expansive auto-interpreta-
tion. Compare Horsch, supra note 23, at 341-42; K. DAM, supra note 3, at 201.
54. Article VIII(2) provides that:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where
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C. National Government Purchasing Laws, Regulations and
Administrative Rules and Practices Under the Agreement
In describing the provisions of the Agreement dealing with the various
national laws, regulations and administrative rules and practices in the area
of government purchasing, we shall follow the basic scheme adopted in Part
II of the article.
1. Visible, Open Discrimination in the Procurement Decision
Article II(1) of the Agreement imposes a general national treatment
and MFN obligation 5 in the following terms:"
With respect to all laws, regulations, procedures and practices regard-
ing government procurement covered by this Agreement, the Parties
shall provide immediately and unconditionally to the products and sup-
pliers of other Parties offering products originating within the customs
territories (including free zones) of the Parties 7 treatment no less
the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in
this Agreement shall be construed to prevent any Party from imposing or enforcing mea-
sures necessary to protect public morals, order or safety, human, animal or plant life or
health, intellectual property, or relating to the products of handicapped persons, of phil-
anthropic institutions or of prison labour.
One author has remarked on the noticeable omission from this exception of certain com-
mon exclusions, e.g., balance of payments reasons, aiding growth in underdeveloped regions of
a nation, assistance for small and minority owned businesses. See Peterson, supra note 23, at
337.
55. The concepts of national treatment and unconditional most-favored-nation (MFN)
treatment under the GATT are discussed supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
56. The full text of Article II of the MTN Agreement, supra note 5, reads as follows:
National Treatment and Non-Discrimination
1. With respect to all laws, regulations, procedures and practices regarding govern-
ment procurement covered by this Agreement, the Parties shall provide immediately and
unconditionally to the products and suppliers of other Parties offering products originat-
ing within the customs territories (including free zones) of the Parties treatment no less
favourable than:
(a) that accorded to domestic products and suppliers; and
(b) that accorded to products and suppliers of any other Party.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply to customs duties and charges of
any kind imposed on or in connexion with importation, the method of levying such duties
and charges, and other import regulations and formalities.
3. The Parties shall not apply rules of origin to products imported for purposes of
government procurement covered by this Agreement from other Parties, which are differ-
ent from the rules of origin applied in the normal course of trade and at the time of
importation to imports of the same products from the same Parties.
57. Under Article 1I(3), in order to determine the origin of imports for purposes of the
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favorable than:
(a) that accorded to domestic products and suppliers; and
(b) that accorded to products and suppliers of any other Party.
This language clearly prohibits Parties from adopting laws and regula-
tions which openly mandate discrimination in the procurement decision it-
self (e.g., by imposing a ban or requiring that domestic suppliers be granted
a preference).58
2. Less Visible Forms of Discrimination or Disadvantage Resulting From
the Operation of Government Purchasing Procedures
a. Invitation to participate. The Agreement contains a number of
provisions designed to ensure that the maximum number of foreign suppli-
ers will be invited to participate in the tendering procedures in the first
place.
Single tendering. Article V(15) limits the use of single tendering, the
most restrictive method of tendering,59 to five carefully circumscribed situa-
tions, namely:
(i) where open or selective tender has been unsuccessful;
(ii) for works of art or patented or copyrighted material, where the
products can be supplied by a particular supplier only;
(iii) for reasons of extreme urgency;
(iv) for additional deliveries by the original supplier in certain
circumstances;
Agreement, Parties are to apply the rules of origin normally applied in trade with each other.
This provision may be criticized because: (1) a Party may apply different rules of origin to
trade from different Parties, thus giving rise to possible disparate treatment between imports;
and (2) different Parties apply different rules of origin, thus giving rise to a possible imbalance
of benefits as between Parties with rules of origin of differing strictness. Compare Peterson,
supra note 23, at 339-40.
58. For a description of the U.S. Federal Buy American Act, and the measures taken to
implement the Agreement into U.S. law, see, e.g., the articles by Peterson, supra note 23;
Kono, supra note 23; and Pomeranz, supra note 37.
59. Article V(l) of the Agreement, supra note 5, defines open, selective and single
tendering procedures as follows:
Open tendering procedures, for the purposes of this Agreement, are those procedures
under which all interested suppliers may submit a tender. Selective tendering procedures,
for the purposes of this Agreement, are those procedures under which, consistent with
paragraph 7 and other relevant provisions of this Article, those suppliers invited to do so
by the entity may submit a tender. Single tendering procedures for the purposes of this
Agreement, are those procedures where the entity contacts suppliers individually, only
under the conditions specified in paragraph 15 below.
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(v) for research and development.
Even in these situations, however, single tendering must not be used
.. .with a view to avoiding maximum possible competition or in a man-
ner which would constitute a means of discrimination among foreign suppli-
ers or protection to domestic producers."" Moreover, an entity must pre-
pare a written report on its use of single tendering,61 while Parties must also
include, in their annual statistical report to the Committee on Government
60. Article V(1) of the Agreement, supra note 5, specifies that:
The Parties shall ensure that the tendering procedures of their entities are consistent with
the provisions below.
However, Article V(I 5) of the Agreement, supra note 5, lays down an exception for single
tendering, and provides in full that:
The provisions of paragraphs 1-14 above governing open and selective tendering pro-
cedures need not apply in the following conditions, provided that single tendering is not
used with a view to avoiding maximum possible competition or in a manner which would
constitute a means of discrimination among foreign suppliers or protection to domestic
producers:
(a) in the absence of tenders in response to an open or selective tender, or when the
tenders submitted have been either collusive or do not conform to the essential require-
ments in the tender, or from suppliers who do not comply with the conditions for partici-
pation provided for in accordance with this Agreement, on condition, however, that the
requirements of the initial tender are not substantially modified in the contract as
awarded;
(b) when, for works of art or for reasons connected with protection of exclusive
rights, such as patents or copyrights, the products can be supplied only by a particular
supplier and no reasonable alternative or substitute exists;
(c) insofar as is strictly necessary when, for reasons of extreme urgency brought
about by events unforeseeable by the entity, the products could not be obtained in time
by means of open or selective tendering procedures;
(d) for additional deliveries by the original supplier which are intended either as
parts replacement for existing supplies or installations, or as the extension of existing
supplies or installations where a change of supplier would compel the entity to purchase
equipment not meeting requirements of interchangeability with already existing
equipment;
(e) when an entity purchases prototypes or a first product which are developed at its
request in the course of, and for, a particular contract for research, experiment, study or
original development. When such contracts have been fulfilled, subsequent purchases of
products shall be subject to paragraphs 1-14 of this Article.
61. Under Article V(16) of the Agreement, supra note 5:
Entities shall prepare a report in writing on each contract awarded under the provi-
sions of paragraph 15 of this Article. Each report shall contain the name of the purchas-
ing entity, value and kind of goods purchased, country of origin, and a statement of the
conditions in paragraph 15 of this Article which prevailed. This report shall remain with
the entities concerned at the disposal of the government authorities responsible for the
entity in order that it may be used if required under the procedures of Articles VI and
VII of this Agreement.
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Procurement, statistics on the number and volume of contracts awarded
under single tender." '
Selective tendering. Under the Agreement an entity is at liberty to
choose between open, public tendering and selective tendering. Use of the
selective tendering procedure is subject to certain qualifications, however,
which are designed to control possible discrimination against foreign
suppliers.
In the case of selective tendering involving the use of pre-established
lists, the Agreement specifies that, although entities may select suppliers to
be invited to tender from among those listed, any selection "shall allow for
equitable opportunities for suppliers on the lists." Moreover, any qualified
supplier who so requests shall be included in the lists "within a reasonably
short time,"" and any qualified supplier included on a permanent list must
be notified if the list is terminated or if its name is removed.65 The entity
must publish annually, in one of the publications in Annex III of the Agree-
ment, information regarding the existence of the lists, the conditions to be
filled by potential suppliers for inclusion on the lists, and the period of va-
lidity of the lists and the formalities for their renewal."
In addition, the Agreement contains obligations which appear to apply
to both types of selective tender. Article V(5) provides that, under selective
tendering procedures, entities shall invite tenders from the "maximum num-
ber of domestic and foreign suppliers"167 and "shall select the suppliers to
participate in the procedure in a fair and non-discriminatory manner." Ar-
ticle V(7) provides that suppliers who request to participate in a particular
proposed purchase must be permitted to submit a tender and be
62. See Article VI(9) of the Agreement, supra note 5:
The Parties shall collect and provide to the Committee on an annual basis statistics
on their purchases. Such reports shall contain the following information with respect to
contracts awarded by all procurement entities covered under this Agreement:
(a) global statistics on estimated value of contracts awarded, both above and below
the threshold value;
(b) statistics on number and total value of contracts awarded above the threshold
value, broken down by entities, categories of products and either nationality of the win-
ning tenderer or country of origin of the product, according to a recognized trade or other
appropriate classification system;
(c) statistics on the total number and value of contracts awarded under each of the
cases of Article V, paragraph 15.
63. Article V(6)(b) of the Agreement, supra note 5.
64. Article V(2)(d) of the Agreement, supra note 5.
65. Article V(2)(e) of the Agreement, supra note 5.
66. Article V(6) of the Agreement, supra note 5.
67. To the extent that this is consistent with efficient operation of the procurement
system.
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Publication of notice of purchase. To ensure that any invitation to par-
ticipate does in fact reach foreign suppliers, Article V(3) of the Agreement
requires that entities must publish, in the appropriate publication as listed
in Annex II, a notice of each purchase they propose to make under open or
selective tendering procedures. Such notice must contain certain essential
information," including whether the procedure is open or selective, and,
under Article V(3) "shall constitute an invitation to participate in either
open or selective tendering procedures."
b. Obstacles preventing foreign suppliers from submitting a respon-
sive bid. The Agreement also contains various provisions aimed at removing
the various obstacles which may in practice effectively prevent a foreign
supplier from submitting a responsive bid.
Information. To ensure that foreign suppliers receive adequate infor-
mation on certain essential matters, the Agreement provides that the entity
must include certain essential information in the notice and it must also
publish a summary of that notice in one of the official languages of the
GATT.70 Tender documentation must be provided, on request, to any sup-
plier participating in an open procedure and to any supplier requesting to
68. ". . .[P]rovided, in the case of those not yet qualified, there is sufficient time to com-
plete the qualification procedure under paragraphs 2-6 of this Article. The number of addi-
tional suppliers permitted to participate shall be limited only by the efficient operation of the
procurement system." Article V(7) of the Agreement, supra note 5.
69. As specified in Article V(4), discussed infra note 70 and accompanying text.
70. Article V(4) of the Agreement, supra note 5, provides in full that:
Each notice of proposed purchase shall contain the following information:
(a) the nature and quantity of the products to be supplied, or envisaged to be pur-
chased in the case of contracts of a recurring nature; (b) whether the procedure is open
or selective; (c) any delivery date; (d) the address and final date for submitting an appli-
cation to be invited to tender or for qualifying for the suppliers' lists, or for receiving
tenders, as well as the language or languages in which they must be submitted; (e) the
address of the entity awarding the contract and providing any information necessary for
obtaining specifications and other documents; (f) any economic and technical require-
ments, financial guarantees and information required from suppliers; (g) the amount and
terms of payment of any sum payable for the tender documentation.
The entity shall publish in one of the official languages of the GATT a summary of
the notice of proposed purchase containing at least the following:
(i) subject matter of the contract;
(ii) time-limits set for the submission of tender or an application to be invited to
tender; and
(iii) addresses from which documents relating to the contracts may be requested.
Article V(8) lays down conditions governing the case where it is necessary to amend or re-
issue the notice.
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participate in a selective procedure. 1 The documentation must contain "all
information necessary to permit them to submit responsive tenders," includ-
ing information on certain specified matters. 7'
Time fimits. With regard to time limits, Article V(9)(a) provides gen-
erally that "[a]ny prescribed time limit shall be adequate to allow foreign
as well as domestic suppliers to prepare and submit tenders before the clos-
ing of the tendering procedures," and the provision specifies the factors to
be taken into account in determining the time limit.73 More particularly,
Article V(10) prescribes a minimum time limit of 30 days for the various
stages in open and selective procedures.
7
'
71. Article V(13)(a) and (b). Article V(13)(c) of the Agreement, supra note 5, provides
for a prompt reply to any reasonable request for relevant information submitted by a supplier
participating in the tendering procedure.
72. Article V(12) of the Agreement, supra note 5, provides in full that:
Tender documentation provided to suppliers shall contain all information necessary
to permit them to submit responsive tenders, including the following:
(a) the address of the entity to which tenders should be sent;
(b) the address where requests for supplementary information should be sent;
(c) the language or languages in which tenders and tendering documents must be
submitted;
(d) the closing date and time for receipt of tenders and the length of time during
which any tender should be open for acceptance;
(e) the persons authorized to be present at the opening of tenders and the date, time
and place of this opening;
(f) any economic and technical requirement, financial guarantees and information or
documents required from suppliers;
(g) a complete description of the products required or of any requirements including
technical specifications, conformity certification to be fulfilled by the products, necessary
plans, drawings and instructional materials;
(h) the criteria for awarding the contract, including any factors other than price that
are to be considered in the evaluation of tenders and the cost elements to be included in
evaluating tender prices, such as transport, insurance and inspection costs, and in the case
of foreign products, customs duties and other import charges, taxes and currency of
payment;
(i) the terms of payment;
(j) any other terms or conditions.
73. Article V(9)(a) of the Agreement, supra note 5, provides that:
Any prescribed time-limit shall be adequate to allow foreign as well as domestic suppliers
to prepare and submit tenders before the closing of the tendering procedures. In deter-
mining any such time-limit, entities shall, consistent with their own reasonable needs,
take into account such factors as the complexity of the proposed purchase, the extent of
sub-contracting anticipated, and the normal time for transmitting tenders by mail from
foreign as well as domestic points.
74. Article V(10) of the Agreement, supra note 5, reads as follows:
(a) In open procedures, the period for the receipt of tenders shall in no case be less
than thirty days from the date of publication referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article.
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Qualification as an eligible supplier. Article V(2) addresses the problem
of discriminatory practices in the qualifying of suppliers. Paragraph 2 pro-
vides generally that "Entities, in the process of qualifying suppliers, shall
not discriminate among foreign suppliers or between domestic and foreign
suppliers." Certain specific obligations" are then set forth to ensure that
the conditions for participating are not discriminatory;7e that those condi-
(b) In selective procedures not involving the use of a permanent list of qualified
suppliers, the period for submitting an application to be invited to tender shall in no case
be less than thirty days from the date of the publication referred to in paragraph 3; the
period for receipt of tenders shall in no case be less than thirty days from the date of
issuance of the invitation to tender.
(c) In selective procedures involving the use of a permanent list of qualified suppli-
ers, the period for receipt of tenders shall in no case be less than thirty days from the
date of the initial issuance of invitations to tender. If the date of initial issuance of invita-
tions to tender does not coincide with the date of the publication referred to in paragraph
3, there shall in no case be less than thirty days between those two dates.
(d) The periods referred to in (a), (b), and (c) above may be reduced either where a
state of urgency duly substantiated by the entity renders impracticable the periods in
question or in the case of the second or subsequent publications dealing with contracts of
a recurring nature within the meaning of paragraph 4 of this Article.
Moreover, under Article V(9)(b):
Consistent with the entity's own reasonable needs, any delivery date shall take into
account the normal time required for the transport of goods from the different points of
supply.
75. Article V(2)(a)-(c) of the Agreement, supra note 5, reads in full as follows:
Entities, in the process of qualifying suppliers, shall not discriminate among foreign
suppliers or between domestic and foreign suppliers. Qualification procedures shall be
consistent with the following:
(a) any conditions for participation in tendering procedures shall be published in
adequate time to enable interested suppliers to initiate and, to the extent that it is com-
patible with efficient operation of the procurement process, complete the qualification
procedures;
(b) any conditions for participation required from suppliers, including financial guar-
antees, technical qualifications and information necessary for establishing the financial,
commercial and technical capacity of suppliers, as well as the verification of qualifica-
tions, shall be no less favourable to foreign suppliers than to domestic suppliers and shall
not discriminate among foreign suppliers;
(c) the process of, and the time required for, qualifying suppliers shall not be used in
order to keep foreign suppliers off a suppliers' list or from being considered for a particu-
lar proposed purchase. Entities shall recognize as qualified suppliers such domestic or
foreign suppliers who meet the conditions for participation in a particular proposed
purchase. Suppliers requesting to participate in a particular proposed purchase who may
not yet be qualified shall also be considered, provided there is sufficient time to complete
the qualification procedure;
76. Article V(2)(b). This language clearly seems to prohibit conditions of participation
which are more stringent for foreign suppliers (formal differentiation). It is less clear, however,
whether the Agreement also prohibits conditions which make no formal distinction between
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tions are published in a timely fashion;"7 and that the process of qualifying
suppliers is not abused to the disadvantage of foreign suppliers.
7 8
Technical specifications. Article IV of the Agreement seeks to control
the possible discriminatory use or effect of technical specifications laying
down the characteristics of the products to be purchased." Article IV(l)
provides generally that such specifications "shall not be prepared, adopted
or applied with a view to creating obstacles to international trade nor have
the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade." Where
appropriate, technical specifications are to be framed "in terms of perform-
ance rather than design" and "be based on international standards, national
technical regulations, or recognized national standards."80
c. Submission, receipt and opening of tenders; evaluation of bids and
award of contracts. Article V(14) of the Agreement lays down provisions
designed to eliminate the various discriminatory practices that may still be
encountered by a foreign supplier who is able to submit a responsive bid.
foreign and domestic suppliers but which have a disparate impact in that they are more diffi-
cult for foreign suppliers to meet in practice (material differentiation) (e.g., requirement that
foreign suppliers maintain a postal address or bank account or adopt a certain business form in
the adjudicating country).
On the one hand, such a disparate impact may in practice be "less favourable to foreign
suppliers" (compare also language in Article 11(l), supra note 56). On the other hand, Article
V(2)(b) avoids the use of the apparently wider language employed in addressing technical
specifications, which must not "have the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to interna-
tional trade," Article IV(l), of the Agreement, supra note 5.
77. Article V(2)(a), of the Agreement, supra note 5.
78. Article V(2)(c). Article V(2)(f), of the Agreement, supra note 5, does provide, how-
ever, that:
[Niothing in sub-paragraphs (a) to (e) above shall preclude the exclusion of any
supplier on grounds such as bankruptcy or false declarations, provided that such an ac-
tion is consistent with the national treatment and non-discrimination provisions of this
Agreement.
See also Article V(6)(c) which requires an entity promptly to start the procedure of qual-
ification, where a supplier not yet qualified requests to participate in a particular tender after
publication of the notice of proposed purchase.
79. Relating to characteristics "such as quality, performance, safety and dimensions, test-
ing and test methods, symbols, terminology, packaging, marking and labeling, and conformity
certification requirements prescribed by procurement entities." Article IV(l), of the Agree-
ment, supra note 5.
80. Article IV(2). Additionally Article IV(3), of the Agreement, supra note 5, provides
that:
There shall be no requirement or reference to a particular trade mark or name,
patent, design or type, specific origin or producer, unless there is no sufficiently precise or
intelligible way of describing the procurement requirements and provided that words such
as "or equivalent" are included in the tenders.
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Article V(14)(d) provides generally that the receipt and opening of tenders
must be consistent with the national treatment and non-discrimination pro-
visions of the Agreement and subject to "procedures and conditions guaran-
teeing the regularity of the openings as well as the availability of informa-
tion from the openings." More specifically, Article V(14)(a)-(c) regulates
the form in which tenders may be submitted, 81 the opportunities to correct
unintentional errors between the opening of tenders and the award of a
contract,a2 and the treatment of delayed tenders. 8 Article V(14)(d) pro-
vides for the supervision of tender openings in open tendering procedures."
Under the Agreement the purchasing authority may still retain sub-
stantial discretion in the evaluation of bids and the actual award of the
contract. Thus, Article V(14)(f) merely provides that:
[U]nless in the public interest an entity decided not to issue the con-
tract, the entity shall make the award to the tenderer who has been
determined to be fully capable of undertaking the contract and whose
tender, whether for domestic or foreign products, is either the lowest
tender or the tender which in terms of the specific evaluation criteria
set forth in the notices or tender documentation is determined to be the
most advantageous."5
d. Information and review. The Agreement aims to be largely self-
81. Article V(14)(a), of the Agreement, supra note 5.
82. Article V(14)(b), of the Agreement, supra note 5.
83. Article V(14)(c), of the Agreement, supra note 5.
84. Article V(14)(d), of the Agreement, supra note 5, states as follows:
: * * To this effect, and in connexion with open procedures, entities shall establish
provisions for the opening of tenders in the presence of either tenderers or their represent-
atives, or an appropriate and impartial witness not connected with the procurement
process...
Article V(14)(d) additionally requires the entity to draw up a written report on the open-
ing of tenders, for use in any possible dispute.
85. Emphasis added. The degree of discretion retained will presumably depend to a large
extent on the terms in which the specific evaluation criteria are framed. Compare Article
V(12)(h), referring to the criteria for awarding the contract, which must be included in the
tender documentation, "including any factors other than price." See supra note 72.
Article V(14)(e) states that tenders can only be considered for an award if they conform
to the essential requirements of the notice or tender documentation at the time of opening and
are from suppliers who comply with the conditions for participation.
Article V contains additional provisions dealing with the treatment of abnormally low
tenders (Article V(14)(e)), the procedure to be followed where no one tender is obviously the
most advantageous (Article V(14)(g)), and the grant of an award on conditions, such as those
relating to offset procurement opportunities or licensing of technology (Article V(14)(h)).
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policing, by enabling suppliers to settle disputes directly with purchasing
entities. To this end, Article VI contains provisions to ensure the availabil-
ity of information and the establishment of procedures for review.
In addition to the obligation on Parties to publish their general rules
and procedures regarding government procurement," entities must provide
aggrieved suppliers with information regarding particular decisions taken
during the various phases of the procurement process. Certain information
must be given as a matter of course;8 7 in other cases the entity is only obli-
gated to give information upon request." Furthermore, the government of
an unsuccessful tenderer may intervene to obtain additional information on
the contract award."
The Agreement requires the establishment of "procedures for the hear-
ing and reviewing of complaints arising in connection with any phase of the
procurement process. . . ." This requirement is set forth in Article VI(5).
86. Article VI(I), of the Agreement, supra note 5:
Any law, regulation, judicial decision, administrative ruling of general application,
and any procedure (including standard contract clauses) regarding government procure-
ment covered by this Agreement, shall be published promptly by the Parties in the appro-
priate publications listed in Annex IV and in such a manner as to enable other Parties
and suppliers to become acquainted with them. The Parties shall be prepared, upon re-
quest, to explain to any other Party their government procurement procedures. Entities
shall be prepared, upon request, to explain to any supplier from a country which is a
Party to this Agreement their procurement practices and procedures.
87. Unsuccessful tenderers must be informed that a contract has been awarded (Article
VI(3)) and a supplier who applies to become a qualified supplier must be informed of any
decision on the application (Article V(2)(e)).
88. E.g., (1) reasons for the rejection of a supplier's application to qualify for a supplier's
list (Article VI(2)); (2) reasons for the refusal to invite a supplier or admit him to tender
(Article VI(2)); and (3) reasons why a supplier's tender was not accepted, including informa-
tion on the characteristics and the relative advantages of the tender selected, as well as the
name of the winning tenderer (Article VI(4)). Entities must also provide a "contact point" to
provide an unsuccessful tenderer with additional information, if he is dissatisfied with the rea-
sons given for rejection of his tender or has further questions about the award (Article VI(5)).
89. Article VI(6) provides that:
The government of the unsuccessful tenderer, which is a Party to this Agreement, may
seek, without prejudice to the provisions under Article VII, such additional information
on the contract award as may be necessary to ensure that the purchase was made fairly
and impartially. To this end, the purchasing government shall provide information on
both the characteristics and relative advantages of the winning tender and the contract
price. Normally this latter information may be disclosed by the government of the unsuc-
cessful tenderer provided it exercises this right with discretion. In cases where release of
this information would prejudice competition in future tenders this information shall not
be disclosed except after consultation with and agreement of the Party which gave the
information to the government of the unsuccessful tenderer.
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E. Evaluation
As the above discussion demonstrates, the MTN Agreement attempts
to control not only the more visible forms of open discrimination in the
procurement decision itself, but also the many less visible ways in which
foreign suppliers may be discriminated against or disadvantaged by the op-
eration of the procurement procedures. The Agreement seeks to achieve this
through the general obligation of national treatment and MFN treatment
in Article II, as well as a number of more specific provisions regulating the
various stages in the procurement process. These more specific provisions
include provisions that impose a particular obligation of non-discrimination
or other treatment, and provisions that prescribe rules of conduct. The rules
of conduct require that various steps be taken during the procurement pro-
cess and ensure that the procedures are "transparent," i.e., identifiable,
open and regularly administered.'
The impact of the Agreement is considerably restricted, however, by
its limited application and by the various limitations on its scope and cover-
age. Moreover, its provisions are frequently vague and unclear. The need to
expand the scope and coverage of the Agreement, and to clarify and im-
prove its provisions, was recognized in the Agreement itself. Article
IX(6)(b) requires the Parties to undertake further negotiations with a view
to broadening and improving the Agreement on the basis of mutual reci-
procity. Such negotiations, which under the terms of this provision are to
take place no later than the end of the third year from the Agreement's
entry into force, were initiated in November 1983.1
90. It is not clear whether the general obligation in Article II and/or the more particular
obligations of non-discrimination reach not only "formal differentiation" but also any "mate-
rial differentiation" that may remain and which has not been removed through compliance
with specific rules of conduct (e.g., are certain conditions for qualifying suppliers which make
no formal distinction between foreign and domestic suppliers but disadvantage the former,
covered by the "no less favorable" language?). See supra note 76.
91. The matters currently under consideration include: expanding coverage of the Agree-
ment to include service contracts and leasing transactions (although the U.S. apparently con-
siders that the Agreement already applies to leasing transactions); extending the lists of gov-
ernmental entities; lowering the threshold value for contracts; improving various provisions on
the tendering procedures. The target date for completion of the negotiations is June 1985. See
Focus on Agreement on Government Procurement, GATT Focus No. 23, July-August 1983,
at 3; Pilot Studies on Certain Services, GATT Focus No. 29, May-June 1984, at 4; U.S.
Effort to Expand GATT Procurement Code Making Progress, But E.C. VAT Issue Un-
resolved, 20 INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 878 (April 24, 1984); Meeting
of the GATT Committee on Government Procurement, INT'L PROCUREMNT COMMITTEE RE-
PORT, supra note 48, Vol. 1, No. 3 at 7 (February 1984), Vol. 1, No. 4 at 1 (May 1984), Vol.
2, No. I at 6 (August 1984). The IPC Report is published quarterly and reports on the meet-
ings of the Committee on Government Procurement, which meets periodically during the year
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IV. EEC REGULATION OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
PROCUREMENT ACTIVITY
National government procurement laws, regulations, and administra-
tive rules and practices have created barriers to trade between the ten
Member States of the European Community. The establishment of the
common market therefore required the removal of these barriers.
Section A of this Part of the article discusses the legal regime that
applied to government purchasing in the EEC before implementation of the
MTN Agreement in the Community legal system. Section B then examines
the problems which arose in connection with that implementation, both
with regard to the impact of the Agreement on the pre-existing legal re-
gime, as well as the method chosen to give effect to the Agreement in the
Community legal system. In both Sections it will be necessary to distinguish
between the rules applicable to trade between the Member States (intra-
Community trade) and trade between the Member States and third
countries.
A. The Legal Regime Regulating Government Purchasing in the EEC
Prior to Implementation of the MTN Agreement
1. Intra-Community Trade
a. Applicable provisions of Community law. In the GATT-MTN
system the rules on government procurement are contained essentially in a
single instrument, the MTN Agreement on Government Procurement. In
the EEC, on the other hand, a number of different provisions are relevant.
EEC Treaty Articles 30-37 and Commission Directive No. 70/32/EEC.
Of central importance are Articles 30-37 of the EEC Treaty which prohibit
restrictions on the free movement of goods between the Member States.
Article 30 states that "[q]uantitative restrictions on imports and all mea-
sures having equivalent effect shall, without prejudice to the following pro-
visions, be prohibited between Member States."O"
to consider matters relating to the implementation of the Agreement and its renegotiation.
92. Articles 30-37 of the EEC Treaty are found in Part Two of the Treaty (Foundations
of the Community), Title I (Free Movement of Goods), Chapter 2 (Elimination of Quantita-
tive Restrictions Between Member States).
Articles 30-33 provide for the abolition of quantitative restrictions on imports from other
Member States and of all measures having equivalent effect, and envisage a timetable for the
abolition of existing restrictions. Article 34 prohibits quantitative restrictions on exports to
other Member States and all measures with equivalent effect. Article 36 contains a number of
exceptions. Article 37 deals with state monopolies of a commercial character.
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The EEC Commission was required under Article 33(7) of the EEC
Treaty to issue directives establishing an appropriate procedure and timeta-
ble for the abolition of measures that had an effect equivalent to quantita-
tive restrictions on imports in intra-Community trade and that were in exis-
tence at the time the Treaty entered into force.9 3 To this end, on December
17, 1969, the Commission adopted a Directive "on supply of products to the
State, its local authorities and legal persons under public law."' 4 Article 4
of this Commission Directive provides that:
Member States shall take all necessary measures to abolish measures
which have an equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions and arise
from the provisions' 5 referred to in Article 3 with regard to products
which must be admitted to free circulation pursuant to Articles 9 and
10 of the Treaty.
It should be noted that, independently of the obligations contained in
the Commission Directive, the prohibition of trade barriers contained in Ar-
ticle 30 has, in any event, itself applied unconditionally since the end of the
transitional period." The Directive may still retain importance, however,
Chapter 1 of Title I concerns the Customs Union (elimination of customs duties and
charges of equivalent effect on trade between Member States, and the setting up of a common
customs tariff).
93. Articles 31 and 32 of the EEC Treaty impose various standstill obligations on the
Member States.
94. Commission Directive No. 70/32/EEC, 13 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 13) 1 (1970).
Article I of the Directive (quotations from the Directive are from an unofficial English transla-
tion) states that:
This Directive shall apply to the supply of products to: the State; its local authorities;
other legal persons under public law. There shall also be considered as coming within this
Directive supplies intended for the execution or completion of public works.
The Commission has also adopted a directive of more general scope, requiring the aboli-
tion of measures with equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions. See Commission Directive
No. 70/50/EEC of 22 December 1970 "based on the provisions of Article 33(7), on the aboli-
tion of measures which have an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions on imports and are
not covered by other provisions adopted in pursuance of the EEC Treaty," 13 J.0. COMM.
EUR. (No. L 13) 29 (1970), Spec. Ed. 1970(1)17 extracted in E. STEIN, P. HAY, & M. WAEL-
BROECK, supra note 8, at 392-95.
The Council has also adopted a similar directive aimed at the abolition of discrimination
in the field of public works. See Council Directive 71/304/EEC of July 26, 1971, adopted on
the basis of Articles 54(2) and 63(2) of the EEC Treaty. 14 J.0. COMM. EUR. (No. L 185) 1
(1971).
95. Defined under Article 2 of the Directive as "[M]easures imposed by law, regulation,
or administrative rules and administrative practices relating to the supplies referred to in Arti-
cle 1, in existence at the time of entry into force of the Treaty."
96. The transitional period expired as of January 1, 1970 in the case of the original Mem-
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not merely as an independent (albeit somewhat redundant) source of obli-
gation upon the Member States but also as an expression of the Commis-
sion's interpretation of the notion of measures with equivalent effect."
Neither Article 30 of the EEC Treaty nor the Commission Directive is
restricted in scope or coverage to a list of particular purchasing entities or
to contracts above a certain value. Moreover, they apply not only to prod-
ucts which originate in Member States but also to products imported from
third countries that are in free circulation in Member States."
ber States. For new Member States, the prohibition has applied unconditionally since the date
of accession, except as otherwise provided in the relevant Act of Accession. See Van Gerven,
The Recent Case Law of the Court of Justice Concerning Articles 30 and 36 of the EEC
Treaty, 14 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 5, 5-6 (1977). This result is envisaged in the Commission
Directive 70/32/EEC, supra note 94, itself. Thus, the 10th recital notes that:
• . .whereas, not later than by the end of the transitional period, all measures having an
equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions must be abolished by the Member States
even if they are not specifically required to do so by a Commission Directive.
The same holds true of the more general Commission Directive 70/50/EEC, supra note 94.
97. The status of the Commission Directive for either purpose appears to be quite un-
clear. Compare the discussion regarding the status of the general Commission Directive No.
70/50/EEC of 22 December 1970, supra note 94, in Oliver, Measures of Equivalent Effect: A
Reappraisal, 19 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 217, 221-22 n.24 (1982) and Barents, New Develop-
ments in Measures Having Equivalent Effect, 18 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 271, 299 (1981).
Oliver enumerates the five directives which the Commission adopted under Article 33(7) and,
in discussing the status of the general Commission Directive, refers to the differing views of
various authors: that this general Directive is binding; and that it is not binding but now
merely fulfills the function of a bundle of non-binding guidelines as to the meaning of mea-
sures with equivalent effect under Article 30. He also points out that, although the Court has
never taken a position on whether the Directive is binding, it has frequently referred to its
provisions with approval. Barents criticizes the Communication which the Commission issued
following the Court's judgment in Case 120/78 Rewe v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung, 1979, dis-
cussed infra note 109, because it does not state whether the Commission still follows the ap-
proach set out in the general Directive. These considerations would appear to be equally appli-
cable to the status of the Commission Directive on public supply contracts.
98. The relevant provisions are contained in Articles 9 and 10 of the EEC Treaty. Article
9 of the EEC Treaty provides that:
1. The Community shall be based upon a customs union which shall cover all trade in
goods and which shall involve the prohibition between Member States of customs duties
on imports and exports and of all charges having equivalent effect, and the adoption of a
common customs tariff in their relations with third countries.
2. The provisions of Chapter 1, Section 1, and of Chapter 2 of this Title shall apply to
products originating in Member States and to products coming from third countries
which are in free circulation in Member States.
Article 10(1) of the Treaty provides that:
Products coming from a third country shall be considered to be in free circulation in
a Member State if the import formalities have been complied with and any customs
duties or charges having equivalent effect which are payable have been levied in that
Member State, and if they have not benefited from a total or partial drawback of such
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The application of these provisions is subject, however, in particular to
the general "police power" and "national security" exceptions contained in
Articles 36 and 223 of the EEC Treaty respectively."
Council "Coordination" Directive No. 77/62/EEC. These provisions
duties or charges.
In Case 41/76 Donckerwolcke and Schou v. Procureur de la Republique, 1976 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 1921, the Court of Justice elaborated on the effect of these provisions in the follow-
ing terms (at considerations 16-18):
Products in free circulation are to be understood as meaning those products which, com-
ing from third countries, were duly imported into any one of the Member States in accor-
dance with the requirements laid down by Article 10.
It appears from Article 9 that, as regards free circulation of goods within the Commu-
nity, products entitled to 'free circulation' are definitively and wholly assimilated to prod-
ucts originating in Member States.
The result of this assimilation is that the provisions of Article 30 concerning the elimina-
tion of quantitative restrictions and all measures having equivalent effect are applicable
without distinction to products originating in the Community and to those which were
put into free circulation in any one of the Member States, irrespective of the actual origin
of these products.
This principle of free circulation is subject, however, to any derogations which may be
authorized by the Commission under Article 115 of the EEC Treaty. See infra note 117 and
accompanying text.
99. Article 36 of the EEC Treaty provides that:
The provisions of Articles 30 to 34 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on
imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public policy
or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the
protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the
protection of industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall
not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on
trade between Member States.
Article 223 of the Treaty provides that:
1. The provisions of this Treaty shall not preclude the application of the following rules:
(a) No Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which
it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security;
(b) Any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the
protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the produc-
tion of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall not adversely
affect the conditions of competition in the common market regarding products which are
not intended for specifically military purposes.
2. During the first year after the entry into force of this Treaty, the Council shall, acting
unanimously, draw up a list of products to which the provisions of paragraph 1(b) shall
apply.
3. The Council may, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, make
changes in this list.
For a general discussion of these and other "safeguard clauses," see E. STEIN, P. HAY &
M. WAELBROECK, supra note 8, at 405-09.
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are supplemented by a Council Directive "coordinating procedures for the
award of public supply contracts."'1 00 The purpose of this Coordination Di-
rective is to supplement the prohibition in Article 30 by introducing equal
conditions of competition for public supply contracts in all the Member
States, thereby "allowing the observance of this prohibition to be better
supervised.'' 101
The Coordination Directive applies to public supply contracts with
"the State, regional or local authorities and the legal persons covered by
public law."' 1 2 In contrast to Article 30 of the Treaty and the Commission
Directive, its scope and coverage is limited by excluding purchasing author-
100. Council Directive No. 77/62/EEC of December 21, 1976, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
L 13) 1 (1977). Adopted on the basis of Article 100 of the EEC Treaty. Article 100 provides
that:
The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, issue
directives for the approximation of such provisions laid down by law, regulation or ad-
ministrative action in Member States as directly affect the establishment or functioning
of the common market.
The Assembly and the Economic and Social Committee shall be consulted in the
case of directives whose implementation would, in one or more Member States, involve
the amendment of legislation.
A similar Council Directive, coordinating the procedures for the award of public works
contracts, was adopted on July 26, 1971. See Council Directive No. 71/305/EEC, 14 J.O.
COMM. EUR. (No. L 185) 5 (1971). Some of these measures adopted in the area of public
contracts are discussed in Turpin, Public Contracts in the EEC, 9 COMMON MKT. L. REv.
411, (1972).
101. Council Directive 77/62/EEC. The full text of the first two recitals is as follows:
Whereas restrictions on the free movement of goods in respect of public supplies are
prohibited by the terms of Articles 30 et seq. of the Treaty;
Whereas that prohibition should be supplemented by the coordination of the procedures
relating to public supply contracts in order, by introducing equal conditions of competi-
tion for such contracts in all the Member States, to ensure a degree of transparency
allowing the observance of this prohibition to be better supervised.
According to the 12th and 13th recitals:
Whereas to ensure development of effective competition in the field of public contracts it is
necessary that contract notices drawn up by the contracting authorities of Member States be
advertised throughout the Community; whereas the information contained in these notices
must enable suppliers established in the Community to determine whether the proposed con-
tracts are of interest to them; whereas for this purpose it is appropriate to give them adequate
information about the goods to be supplied; whereas, more particularly in restricted proce-
dures, advertisement is intended to enable suppliers of Member States to express their interest
in contracts by seeking from the contracting authorities invitations to tender under the re-
quired conditions;
Whereas additional information concerning contracts must, as is customary in the Member
States, be given in the contract documents for each contract or in an equivalent document.
102. Or, in Member States where the latter are unknown, the corresponding bodies speci-
fied in Annex 1. Article l(b) of the Directive.
[Vol. 8
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
ities in certain sectors'"3 as well as contracts below a certain threshold. 10' In
common with these other provisions, however, the Coordination Directive is
also subject to the general "police power" and "national security" excep-
tions contained in Articles 36 and 223 of the EEC Treaty.
105
b. National government purchasing laws, regulations and adminis-
trative rules and practices under Community law
Visible, open discrimination in the procurement decision. Laws and reg-
ulations which openly mandate discrimination against foreign suppliers in
the procurement decision itself (e.g., a ban or certain preferences) clearly
seem to be prohibited by Article 30 of the EEC Treaty as measures having
equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions. Such measures are specifically
enumerated, moreover, in Article 3 of the Commission Directive. 06
Less visible forms of discrimination or disadvantage resulting from the
operation of government purchasing procedures. As in the case of the MTN
Agreement, the Community has also attempted to control not only the more
visible kinds of open discrimination, but also the many less visible ways in
which foreign suppliers may suffer discrimination or disadvantage in the
operation of the purchasing procedures themselves. These less visible mea-
sures must be evaluated under the general prohibition of measures with
equivalent effect in Article 30 of the Treaty. They also must be evaluated
under the more specific rules that regulate the various stages in the pro-
curement process. Provisions in the Commission Directive require the aboli-
tion of particular national measures that are regarded as being measures
with equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions. 07 The Coordination Di-
103. Under Article 2(2) the Directive does not apply to "bodies which administer trans-
port services," or to "bodies which administer production, distribution and transmission or
transport services for water or energy and telecommunications services."
104. Defined in Article 5()(a) as public supply contracts whose estimated value net of
VAT is not less than 200,000 European units of account. For the national currency equivalents
of the ECU to be used as of January 1, 1984 for determining the value of public supply
contracts covered by the Directive, see 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 320) 2 (1983).
105. See 5th recital.
106. The first part of Article 3 states that the Commission Directive 70/32/EEC, supra
note 94, relates to:
a. provisions which prohibit, in whole or in part, the supply of imported products;
b. provisions which limit, in whole or in part, supply to domestic products or grant
them a preference, other than aid within the meaning of Article 92 of the
Treaty, whether or not accompanied by conditions;
107. Article 3 of the Commission Directive, 70/32/EEC, supra note 94, continues:
c. provisions which are applicable only to imported products and which, by some
means other than taxation, make the supply of imported products more difficult
1984)
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rective, moreover, contains provisions that prescribe particular rules of con-
duct, requiring various steps to be taken during the procurement procedures
and ensuring transparency of those procedures. These provisions are
broadly similar to those in the MTN Agreement, although there are fre-
quent variations in detail and wording.10 8
or costly than that of domestic products.
It relates, in particular, to the following provisions-
provisions which prescribe differentiation in treatment, to the detriment of imported
products, with regard to the lodgment of a deposit or payments on account;
provisions which make admission of imported products conditional upon the grant-
ing of reciprocity by the Member State from which they come;
provisions which prohibit the substitution during execution of the contract, of prod-
ucts exported from a Member State other than that, if any, referred to in the con-
tract, in so far [sic] they have the same characteristics as those prescribed in the
contract;
provisions which prescribe, as a condition of admission of supplies of imported goods
only, the agreement or the opinion of a body other than the adjudicating body;
provisions which require only suppliers of imported products to open a postal or
banking account.
Article 3 goes on to provide that the Directive relates, moreover, to the following
provisions-
provisions which require suppliers of both domestic and imported products either to
have a postal address or to open a postal or banking account in the country of the
adjudicating body;
provisions which impose technical requirements applicable to domestic and imported
products indiscriminately;
Insofar as their restrictive effect on the free circulation of goods goes beyond the effect
proper to provisions of the kind.
This is the case, in particular, where-
the restrictive effect on free circulation of goods is out of proportion to the desired
result;
the same objective may be attained by another method which represents less of an
obstacle to trade.
108. See part 1.2 of the Commission's Explanatory Memorandum accompanying its Pro-
posal for a Council Directive Amending Directive 77/62/EEC Coordinating Procedures for
the Award of Public Supply Contracts, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C. 287) 9 (November 17,
1979). The Commission notes that "in matters of procedure and transparency, the arrange-
ments under the MTN Agreement do not differ greatly from those adopted by the Council in
the Community Directive."
Thus the Council Directive 77/62/EEC, supra note 100, also contains provisions dealing
with: the use of single tendering; the use of selective tendering--called "restricted procedures"
(the Directive, however, does not seem to envisage selective tender involving the use of pre-
established lists); the publication of a notice of proposed purchase; the provision of information
in the notice, invitation to tender, and tender documentation; time limits; the qualification of
suppliers; technical specifications for products; the evaluation of bids and award of contracts.
The implementation of the MTN Agreement in the Community legal system necessitated
the adoption of measures to take account of differences between the two instruments, see infra
notes 121-35 and accompanying text.
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Any discrimination or disadvantage that may remain and that has not
been removed by compliance with specific rules of conduct or the particular
obligations in the Commission Directive may be caught by the general pro-
hibition in Article 30.1"e
109. The Court of Justice has given a wide interpretation to the concept of measures with
equivalent effect under Article 30 of the EEC Treaty. See the Court's formulation in Case 8/
74 Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 837, where the Court stated
(at consideration 5):
All trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or
indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade are to be considered as mea-
sures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions.
This definition has been repeated on a number of occasions. See, e.g., Case 41/76 Donck-
erwolcke, at consideration 19.
The Court has clearly endorsed the Commission's view (see, e.g., the Commission Direc-
tive on public supply contracts, Article 3) that the concept includes measures which make no
formal distinction between domestic and foreign products and suppliers (material differentia-
tion) as well as those which formally discriminate between them (formal differentiation). See
Case 120/78 Rewe v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
649 where the Court stated (at consideration 8):
In the absence of common rules relating to the production and marketing of alcohol
.. . it is for the Member States to regulate all matters relating to the production and
marketing of alcohol and alcoholic beverages on their own territory.
Obstacles to movement within the Community resulting from disparities between the
national laws relating to the marketing of the products in question must be accepted
insofar as those provisions may be recognized as being necessary in order to satisfy
mandatory requirements relating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision,
the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the defence of
the consumer.
The Court found, however, that the measures in question-the fixing of a minimum alco-
hol content for alcoholic beverages intended for human consumption in Germany-were not
justified and were therefore prohibited under Article 30.
It is not clear, however, whether the Court accepts the Commission's test of proportional-
ity in defining measures with equivalent effect in the case of measures causing material differ-
entiation, as contrasted with using such a criterion in evaluating the application of exceptions
to the prohibition of Article 30. It is also unclear how the "mandatory requirements" excep-
tions mentioned in Rewe relate to the exceptions expressly provided for in Article 36 (see
supra note 99).
In a recent case, in which the Court held the Irish Government's "Buy Irish" campaign to
be contrary to Article 30 of the Treaty, the Court clarified that the prohibition in that Article
also covers governmental measures which are not binding in nature, Case 249/81 Commission
of The European Community v. Ireland, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 4005, 4023 (Re "Buy
Irish" Campaign). The Court stated (at consideration 28) that:
• . .Even measures adopted by the government of a member-State which do not having
binding effect may be capable of influencing the conduct of traders and consumers in that
State and thus of frustrating the aims of the Community as set out in Article 2 and
enlarged upon in Article 3 of the Treaty.
For a comment on this case, see Comment, 24 HARV. INT'L L. J. 205 (1983).
It seems to be generally considered that measures with equivalent effect may emanate
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2. Trade Between the Member States and Third Countries
Member States' government procurement laws, regulations, adminis-
trative rules and practices which discriminate against or disadvantage for-
eign products and suppliers may also create barriers to trade between the
Member States and non-Member States (third countries). In the preceding
subsection the focus was on the removal of barriers to trade between the
Member States themselves. The measures eliminating such barriers to in-
tra-Community trade do not, however, apply as such to trade between the
Member States and third countries.110
This treatment of third country products and suppliers is a commercial
policy matter that has come within the exclusive competence of the Com-
munity since the end of the transitional period. Article 113(1) of the EEC
Treaty provides that:
After the transitional period has ended, the common commercial policy
shall be based on uniform principles, particularly in regard to changes
in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, the
achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalization, export policy
and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in case of
dumping or subsidies.' [emphasis added]
from any layer of government (central, regional or local). The concept appears to embrace acts
of the legislature and judiciary as well as the executive, and possibly even acts of private
individuals as well.
A detailed discussion of measures with equivalent effect is beyond the scope of this article.
For a full discussion of the intricate and perplexing problems of interpreting Articles 30 and
36, see, e.g., Oliver, supra note 97; Barents, supra note 97; Van Gerven, supra note 96; D.
WYATr & A. DASHWOOD, supra note 31, at Ch. 10; see also Oliver, A Review of the Case
Law of the Court of Justice on Articles 30 to 36 EEC in 1983, 21 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
221 (1984).
110. It should be remembered, however, that third country suppliers and products inevita-
bly derive some incidental benefit from those measures. Compare Bourgeois, supra note 3 at
16, discussing the impact of the MTN Agreement and compliance with its rules of conduct.
111. Article 113(2) of the EEC Treaty provides that the Commission shall submit pro-
posals to the Council for implementing the common commercial policy, and Article 113(4)
provides that the Council shall act by qualified majority. Articles 113(3) and 114 lay down a
special procedure for the negotiation and conclusion of agreements with third countries.
The Court has given a very broad interpretation to the concept of the common commer-
cial policy. In Opinion 1/75, 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1355, 1362, the Court stated that the
concept of a commercial policy has ". . . the same content whether it is applied in the context
of the international action of a State or to that of the Community." The Court confirmed this
broad interpretation in Opinion 1/78 on the International Rubber Agreement, 1979 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 2871, where it also noted that the common commercial policy is an evolving con-
cept (see consideration 44), and, moreover, that the enumeration of matters in Article 113 "is
conceived as a non-exhaustive enumeration which must not. as such, close the door to the
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The differing national policies regarding the access of third country
suppliers and products to public supply contracts should have been harmo-
nized, therefore, by the end of the transitional period, within the framework
of Community common commercial policy measures adopted either as part
of the Community's autonomous commercial policy or pursuant to an inter-
national agreement on the subject. As a matter of fact, however, in this, as
in several other areas falling within the ambit of the common commercial
policy, no such Community measures were adopted.
Some Community action was necessary, however, to deal with two
problems which resulted from this situation. First, since the competence of
the Community in this area had been exclusive since the end of the transi-
tional period, the Member States arguably needed Community authoriza-
tion to maintain their differing existing national commercial policy mea-
sures."" Such authorization was apparently given by the Council in a
Resolution of December 21, 1976.118 Having recognized the need for uni-
form Community action in this area,114 the Council "noted" that " . . .
application in a Community context of any other process intended to regulate external trade"
(see consideration 45).
112. As required by so-called Donckerwolcke doctrine. See Case 41/76 Donckerwolcke,
at consideration 32, where the Court stated:
As full responsibility in the matter of commercial policy was transferred to the Commu-
nity by means of Article 113(1) measures of commercial policy of a national character
are only permissible after the end of the transitional period by virtue of a specific authori-
zation by the Community.
See also, e.g., the submissions of the Commission in Case 266/81, La Societa Italiana per
l'Oleodotto Transalpino (SLOT) v. le Ministere Italien des finances, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 731, 751. For an analysis supporting this position, see J. USHER. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
LAW AND NATIONAL LAW, THE IRREVERSIBLE TRANSFER? 58-59 (1981).
The consequences of failure to obtain an authorization are not entirely clear. Even though
a Member State may arguably be in breach of its obligations under the Treaty, in failing to
obtain such an authorization for its national commercial policy measures, this would presuma-
bly not necessarily entail their automatic "invalidity."
For an analysis of an analogous problem in the United States, i.e., the constitutionality of
state "Buy American" laws, see Olson, Federal Limitations on State "Buy American" Laws,
21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L., 177, 178 (1982).
113. Council Resolution of December 21, 1976 concerning access to Community public
supply contracts for products originating in non-member countries. 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
C 11) 1 (1977).
114. See the 2d recital of the Council Resolution (Dec. 21, 1976) Id.:
Whereas the implementation of this Directive (author's note: the Coordination Directive
77/62/EEC) increases the need for the Community to determine the conditions under
which public supply contracts awarded by Member States may be open to products
originating in non-member countries.
See also points 3 and 4 of the Resolution, under which the Council:
3. [C]onsiders it necessary in the first place to obtain balanced concessions in the areas in
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the Member States may continue to apply, in accordance with the provi-
sions of the Treaty, existing commercial policy measures in respect of pub-
lic supply contracts concerning products and categories of products
originating in non-member countries." 115
Secondly, the existence of differing national measures could cause
trade deflection or economic difficulties for certain Member States, in par-
ticular because tenders might include third country products already in
"free circulation" within the Community."' This type of problem is specifi-
cally addressed by Article 115 of the EEC Treaty, which empowers the
Commission to authorize Member States to take measures to protect their
national commercial policy, where such trade deflection or economic diffi-
culties arise.117
The Commission accordingly issued a Statement," published simulta-
neously with the Council Resolution, stating its intention to authorize
Member States, upon application and after examining such application, to
exclude from their public contracts "certain goods or categories of goods
originating in third countries which are in free circulation in another Mem-
ber State, in all cases where similar arrangements are made as regards di-
question in the negotiations taking place within the OECD and due to take place later
within the GATT; with this aim, invites the Commission to submit to it new proposals
based on Article 113 of the Treaty;
4. [A]grees, independently of the results of the negotiations, to promote, on a proposal
from the Commission, the coordination and progressive standardization of the policies
referred to under 1 above.
This invitation for proposals based on Article 113 of the Treaty would seem to evidence
the Council's acceptance of the argument that the access to public supply contracts for prod-
ucts originating in non-member countries is indeed a matter falling within the scope of the
common commercial policy.
115. See point 1 of the Resolution.
116. See the discussion supra note 98 and accompanying text.
117. The first paragraph of Article 115 of the EEC Treaty provides that:
In order to ensure that the execution of measures of commercial policy taken in
accordance with this Treaty by any Member State is not obstructed by deflection of
trade, or where differences between such measures lead to economic difficulties in one or
more of the Member States, the Commission shall recommend the methods for the requi-
site cooperation between Member States. Failing this, the Commission shall authorize
Member States to take the necessary protective measures, the conditions and details of
which it shall determine.
According to Usher, this means that a Member State needs to obtain a "double authorisa-
tion." See J. USHER, supra note 112, at 59:
The result of Donckerwolcke is, however, that in order to protect a national commercial
policy threatened by imports via another Member State, a Member State must obtain a
double authorisation: it needs Community authorisation to have the policy in the first
place, and Community authorisation to protect that policy under Article 115.
118. 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 11) 2 (1977).
[Vol. 8
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
rectly imported products originating in third countries." The Commission
noted that "[T]he application of such measures will only have effect at the
time of the examination of tenders and not at the point of importation into
the Member State concerned." 1 9
B. Implementation of the MTN Agreement in the Community Legal
System
The Council concluded the MTN Agreement on Government Procure-
ment in exercise of the exclusive competence of the Community to conclude
international agreements falling within the scope of the common commer-
cial policy.120 The implementation of the MTN Agreement in the Commu-
119. With the result that these measures "will not therefore entail any controls nor will
they lead to the creation of any form of barrier at the frontiers within the Community and will
not affect the import arrangements for the import of products originating in third countries,
nor in particular the extent of liberalization at Community or national level." 20 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. C 11) 2 (1977). For further discussion of these various issues compare Bourgeois,
supra note 3, at 31 (discussing the Council Resolution and Commission Statement following
the conclusion of the MTN Agreement, see infra notes 142 and 143 and accompanying text.).
120. Council Decision No. 80/271/EEC of December 10, 1979 concerning the conclusion
of the Multilateral Agreements resulting from the 1973 to 1979 trade negotiations. 23 03.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 71) 1 (1980). See EEC Treaty, Art. 113, supra note 111, on the Common
Commercial Policy.
For a discussion of the question of Community powers to conclude the Agreement and a
description of the procedures involved, see Bourgeois, supra note 3, at 19-23, Jackson, Louis
and Matsushita, supra note 5, at 279-89. The Commission had relied upon Opinion 1/78,
supra note Ill, to support its position that the Community possessed exclusive competence
under Article 113 to conclude all of the MTN non-tariff barrier agreements. On this point and
the ensuing "compromise solution," under which the Standards Code and the Civil Aircraft
Code were concluded as "mixed agreements," with the participation of the Member States
alongside the Community, see Bourgeois, supra note 3, at 21-22. Bourgeois also expresses the
view that the reliance upon Article 113 as the legal basis for the power of the Community to
conclude the MTN Agreements ought logically to lead to greater reliance by the Community
upon this provision than hitherto in the area of external trade. See Bourgeois, supra note 3, at
22.
The particular point at issue in Opinion 1/78 was the question whether the Community
had exclusive power to conclude the International Rubber Agreement or whether it should be
concluded as a "mixed agreement" with the participation of the Member States alongside the
Community. The Court stated that, even though the Agreement "stands apart from ordinary
commercial and tariff agreements" since it is a "more structured instrument in the form of an
organization of the market on a world scale..." (consideration 41), it could nevertheless fall
within the scope of the common commercial policy and thus within the exclusive powers of the
Community. Moreover, if the "essential objective" of the Agreement fell within the common
commercial policy, the Community would still possess exclusive power to conclude it, even
though the nature of the Agreement also gave it the characteristic of a measure of general
economic policy, or development aid (see considerations 42 and 47-49),and even if certain
individual clauses "of an altogether subsidiary or ancillary nature" concerned matters which
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nity legal system affected both the legal regime governing intra-Community
trade as well as the regime applying to trade between Member States and
third countries.
1. Intra-Community Trade
As will be discussed in Subsection 2(a), infra, Member State entities,
when operating under the Agreement, are bound under Community law to
observe its obligations with regard to suppliers and products from other
signatories.
A potential problem arose, however, because the provisions of the
Agreement are in some respects more favorable than those laid down in the
Council Coordination Directive. Since the Agreement does not apply as
such to suppliers and products from other Member States (intra-Commu-
nity trade), 1 it was necessary to ensure that Member States' suppliers and
products would be treated at least as favorably as those from third country
signatories.
a. Council "Adaptation" Directive No. 80/767/EEC. To deal with
this problem, the Council adopted Council Directive No. 80/767/EEC,
12 2
which is intended to introduce the more favorable provisions of the Agree-
ment into the intra-Community regime by "adapting and supplementing"
the provisions of the Coordination Directive which governs trade between
the Member States.
The Directive is limited in scope, applying only to Member State enti-
ties 22 and contracts1 2 ' covered by the MTN Agreement. Consequently, the
could be regarded as falling within the competences of the Member States (e.g., technological
assistance, research programmes, labour conditions in the industry concerned or consultations
relating to national tax policies, see consideration 56). The extent and nature of the treaty-
making powers of the Community falls outside the scope of this article. However, there is
abundant literature on this subject. For a general discussion, see e.g., T. HARTLEY, THE FOUN-
DATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, 145-172 (1981).
121. See the Commission's Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 108, part I. 3.
See also Bourgeois, supra note 3, at 30.
122. Council Directive No. 80/767/EEC of July 22, 1980 adapting and supplementing in
respect of certain contracting authorities Directive 77/62/EEC coordinating procedures for
the award of public supply contracts 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 215) 1 (1980).
It is possible that the principle of Community preference would in any event have obli-
gated the Member States to extend these more favorable provisions to suppliers and products
from other Member States. See Bourgeois, supra note 3, at 30.
123. See Article 1(1) of the Directive (80/767/EEC) supra note 122.
124. See Article 3(!) of the Directive, supra note 122. The current value denominated in
ECU's of contracts covered by the Council Directive and the Agreement on Government Pro-
curement (177,000 ECU's) is stated in 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 320) 2 (1983). The
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less favorable provisions of the Coordination Directive continue to apply to
all other contracting authorities.
The adaptations and additions introduced by the Directive, even for
entities and contracts covered, are in fact minimal. The Directive eliminates
one of the exceptions to the Community procedures2" and obligates the
entities to prepare a written report on contracts awarded under single
tendering.12 Time limits applicable in open 1 7 and restricted128 procedures
are revised and extended. Finally, the Directive contains a general obliga-
tion on Member States'" to "apply in their relations conditions as
favorable as those which they grant to third countries in implementation of
the Agreement, in particular those in Articles V and VI on the selective
procedure,80 information and review."' '
In evaluating the impact of the Directive, several observations may be
made. First, the Council declined to make use of an opportunity to increase
the degree of liberalization in intra-Community trade by extending the
more favorable provisions of the MTN Agreement to all the public
purchasing already covered by the Coordination Directive. Second, with re-
gard to those purchasing activities which are covered by the "Adaptation"
Directive, the Directive does not appear to contain any provisions at all,
incorporating the considerably more detailed rules of the Agreement on the
submission, receipt and opening of tenders. Moreover, it is not entirely clear
whether the general obligation of favorable treatment applies in any event,
in the case of every purchase, or only when third country suppliers are actu-
ally involved.'8 2 In the latter case, this could result in yet a further disparity
in the intra-Community regime in that, in some cases, for example, an en-
threshold value in the MTN Agreement is lower than that specified in the Coordination Direc-
tive; see supra note 104.
125. See Article 4 of the Directive, supra note 122. These exceptions in the Coordination
Directive, see supra note 100, mainly concern the use of single tendering.
126. Id. at Art. 5.
127. Forty-two days for the receipt of tenders, see Id. at Art. 6(1).
128. Forty-two days for the receipt of applications to be invited to tender. Id. at Art.
6(2); thirty days for the receipt of tenders, Art. 6(4).
129. See Article 7 of the Directive, supra note 122.
130. Especially MTN Agreement Article V(7) which provides that suppliers requesting
to participate in a particular proposed purchase shall be permitted to submit a tender and be
considered, subject to efficient operation of the procurement system, and provided, in the case
of suppliers not yet qualified, there is sufficient time to complete the qualification process. See
supra note 68 and accompanying text.
131. The Council Coordination Directive, 77/62/EEC contains no provision requiring the
provision of information and establishment of review procedures by purchasing authorities.
132. In other words, when is an entity acting "in implementation of the Agreement"
within the meaning of Article 7?
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tity would be obligated to give information and afford opportunity for re-
view, but not in other cases.1"
This "minimalist" approach of the Directive has been severely criti-
cized elsewhere. 1" Indeed, the proposal by the Commission would have
gone much further. " The Council's approach demonstrates that it is fre-
quently difficult in practice to develop the political will necessary for fur-
ther relinquishment of Member State sovereignty.
2. Trade Between the Member States and Third Countries
In examining the effect of the MTN Agreement on the legal regime
applying to trade between Member States and third countries, it is neces-
sary to make a distinction between procurement which is covered, and pro-
curement which is not covered, by the Agreement.
a. Procurement covered by the Agreement. By concluding the MTN
Agreement on Government Procurement in the exercise of its exclusive
powers in the area of the common commercial policy under Article 113 of
the Treaty, 3 6 the Community accepted the obligations of the Agreement
and assumed responsibility for securing their due performance, i.e., for en-
suring that the differing national commercial policy measures would indeed
be brought into line with the provisions of the Agreement. "'
It was unnecessary for the Community institutions to take any action
beyond proper conclusion of the Agreement, either to introduce its provi-
sions into the Community legal system, or to create a Community law obli-
gation upon the Member States to ensure its due performance for two rea-
sons. First, a Community agreement is automatically "incorporated" into
133. On this point, compare Bourgeois, supra note 3, at 30.
134. Id.
135. 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 287) 9 (1979). The Commission proposal would have
introduced the more favorable provisions of the Agreement into the Coordination Directive by
way of amendment, and in much more precise terms, in particular avoiding the ambiguous
language of Article 7 of the Directive.
The Coordination Directive, as thus amended, would arguably have applied to all entities
under the direct or substantial control of the Member States (and not just those listed in the
Annex to the Agreement), when engaged in procurement above the threshold value in the
Agreement. It would also have applied some of the amendments (e.g., regarding single tender-
ing and time limits) to regional and local authorities and the legal persons governed by public
law in the Member States.
136. See supra note 120.
137. See Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v. Kupferberg, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
3641, consideration 13, quoted infra note 140.
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the Community legal system by virtue of its conclusion.'" As the Court of
Justice has stated, "[T]he provisions of the Agreement, from the coming
into force thereof, form an integral part of Community Law."1 3 9 Second,
Article 228(2) states that an agreement concluded by the Community is
"binding on the institutions of the Community and on Member States,"
thereby expressly creating a Community law obligation for the Member
States to take the necessary measures to ensure proper implementation of
such an Agreement.140 Moreover, it is possible that an individual may have
a right under Community law to directly invoke the provisions of the
Agreement, in a case where a Member State has either incorrectly imple-
mented its provisions or has failed to adopt any implementing measures at
138. See infra at 142.
139. See Case 181/73 Haegeman v. Belgium, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 449, considera-
tion 5. The Agreement referred to is the Athens Agreement, the Association Agreement be-
tween the EEC and Greece, concluded in 1961.
See also Case 104/81 Kupferberg, at consideration 13, quoted infra note 140.
140. Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v. Kupferberg considerations 11 and 13. This
Case contains a very interesting passage dealing with the matters presently under discussion:
11. The Treaty establishing the Community has conferred upon the institutions the
power not only of adopting measures applicable in the Community but also of making
agreements with non-member countries and international organizations in accordance
with the provisions of the Treaty. According to Article 228 (2) these agreements are
binding on the institutions of the Community and on Member States. Consequently, it is
incumbent upon the Community institutions, as well as upon the Member States, to en-
sure compliance with the obligations arising from such agreements.
12. The measures needed to implement the provisions of an agreement concluded by the
Community are to be adopted, according to the state of Community law for the time
being in the areas affected by the provisions of the agreement, either by the Community
institutions or by the Member States. That is particularly true of agreements such as
those concerning free trade where the obligations entered into extend to many areas of a
very diverse nature.
13. In ensuring respect for commitments arising from an agreement concluded by the
Community institutions the Member States fulfil an obligation not only in relation to the
non-member country concerned but also and above all in relation to the Community
which has assumed responsibility for the due performance of the agreement. That is why
the provisions of such an agreement, as the Court has already stated in its judgment of
30 April 1974 in Case 181/73 Haegeman form an integral part of the Community legal
system.
14. It follows from the Community nature of such provisions that their effect in the
Community may not be allowed to vary according to whether their application is in prac-
tice the responsibility of the Community institutions or of the Member States and, in the
latter case, according to the effects in the internal legal order of each Member State
which the law of that State assigns to international agreements concluded by it. There-
fore it is for the Court, within the framework of its jurisdiction in interpreting the provi-
sions of agreements, to ensure their uniform application throughout the Community.
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b. Procurement which is not covered by the Agreement. Since the
application, scope and coverage of the MTN Agreement is limited, its im-
plementation in the Community legal system only effects a partial harmoni-
zation of the differing national commercial policy measures concerning ac-
cess of third country suppliers and products to government supply contracts.
These measures remain unharmonized, therefore, to the extent they are not
governed by the obligations under the Agreement.
Once again, therefore, the Council adopted a Resolution authorizing
the Member States to maintain their differing national commercial policy
measures, 142 and the Commission again issued a Statement regarding its
intended application of Article 115 of the Treaty. 4 8 These two measures
apply to all entities not covered by the Agreement, entities covered by the
Agreement but as regards products or contracts not covered by it, and enti-
ties covered by the Agreement vis-a-vis non-signatory countries.
V. COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULES OF THE SYSTEM AND THE ROLE OF
INTERNATIONAL AND PRIVATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND ENFORCEMENT
MECHANISMS
So far we have examined the rules of two international regimes-those
of the GATT-MTN System and of the European Community-regulating
national government procurement activity. As in any international regime,
the effectiveness of the rules depends on the degree of actual compliance by
the national governments and their purchasing authorities. In addition to
the willingness of governments to voluntarily ensure respect for the rules of
the system in any event (for whatever reasons), compliance is also depen-
dent to a considerable extent upon the effectiveness of available dispute set-
tlement and enforcement mechanisms. The greater the effectiveness of such
mechanisms, the greater is the likelihood of compliance with the rules, be-
cause effective dispute resolution and enforcement mechanisms remedy and
deter departures from the rules, thus encouraging compliance, albeit invol-
untary. Moreover, by being effective, these mechanisms also preserve the
integrity of, and develop confidence in, the system, and thus help to develop
an attitude of willing, voluntary compliance.
141. See infra notes 173 to 180 and accompanying text.
142. Council Resolution of July 22, 1980, concerning access to Community public supply
contracts for products originating in third countries, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 211) 2
(1980).
143. Commission Statement concerning Article 115 of the Treaty, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. C 211) 1 (1980).
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
This part of the article therefore examines the application of two types
of mechanisms for settling disputes and enforcing the rules of the respective
systems. An evaluation of their comparative effectiveness may assist in as-
sessing the degree of likely compliance with, and effectiveness of, the inter-
national rules on government procurement. These two mechanisms, both of
which may be regarded as dispute settlement and enforcement techniques,
are the international dispute settlement and enforcement procedures which
exist in those systems; and the possibility for a domestic court to apply the
international rule directly, in particular in a dispute between the national
authorities and a private individual, who can thus act as a "private police-
man" for the system.
The international dispute settlement and enforcement procedures will
be discussed in Section A. The possibility for an individual to invoke di-
rectly the international rule before a domestic court forms the subject of
Section B.1 4
A. International Dispute Settlement and Enforcement Procedures
This discussion will not attempt a detailed description of the various
procedures in the two systems, but will instead focus on the following cen-
tral issues: (1) the prosecutorial function; (2) the definition of the claim; (3)
the adjudicative function; (4) the remedies available; and (5) the extent to
which the procedures operate with reference to the power position of the
parties (power diplomacy) rather than with reference to the interpretation
or application of an agreed-upon existing rule (rule diplomacy), and with
what consequences.
1. International Dispute Settlement and Enforcement in the GA TT-MTN
System, With Particular Reference to the Agreement on Government
Procurement
The general dispute settlement and enforcement procedures of the
GATT are found in Articles XXII and XXIII,1" 5 and the serious deficien-
cies inherent in these procedures have been described elsewhere by Profes-
sor Jackson. 14 The MTNs resulted in an "Agreed Description of the Cus-
tomary Practice of the GATT in the Field of Dispute Settlement." This
144. This part of the article, particularly in its discussion of the European Community,
partly draws on another article by the present writer. See Jones supra note 19, at 25-27, 32-
50.
145. For a description of these procedures, see JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 2,
at 422-430; J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE, supra note 4, at 163-89.
146. See the article by J. Jackson, supra note 6, at 40-43.
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"Agreed Description" is an Annex to the Understanding Regarding Notifi-
cation, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance which was for-
mulated as part of the "Framework" Agreement." 7
In addition to this general Understanding on Articles XXII and
XXIII, many of the MTN Agreements also contain their own provisions
dealing with dispute settlement and enforcement, which basically mirror
the scheme in Articles XXII and XXIII.'
Although the question is not entirely free from doubt, it seems that the
procedures in Article VII of the Agreement on Government Procurement
are exclusive, i.e., there is no recourse to Articles XXII and XXIII after the
Agreement procedures have been exhausted,"' and the following discussion
will therefore attempt to evaluate the extent to which the procedures in this
Agreement alone represent an improvement over the procedures of Article
XXII and XXIII, as well as the extent of any remaining deficiencies.
a. Overview of the Government Procurement Agreement procedures.
The Agreement envisages five basic steps in the procedure. First, there is a
bilateral consultation between the disputing states.'5 0 If the dispute is not
resolved by such consultations, a party to the dispute may formally refer
the matter to the Committee on Government Procurement, which is com-
posed of representatives from each of the Parties to the Agreement.' The
147. See supra note 5. The "Agreed Description" and the "Understanding" embody vari-
ous minor reforms in the GATT Article XXII and XXIII procedures. The contracting parties
agreed to some further minor modifications at the GATT ministerial meeting in November
1982. At that meeting the contracting parties also "reaffirmed that consensus will continue to
be the traditional method of resolving disputes; however, they agreed that obstruction in the
process of dispute settlement shall be avoided." See, the text of the communique issued after
the GATT ministerial meeting, 18 INr'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 362, 364-
65 (November 11, 1982).
148. Bourgeois, supra note 3, at 16. For a description of the "Framework Agreement"
and the dispute settlement procedures in the separate Agreements, see Jackson, supra note 6,
at 44-47. Professor Jackson sees a number of dangers inherent in the "balkanization," or frag-
mentation, of dispute settlement under the various Agreements. See also, Hudec, GA TT Dis-
pute Settlement After the Tokyo Round: An Unfinished Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145
(1980) and Harris, The Post-Tokyo Round GATT Role in International Trade Dispute Set-
tlement, I INT'L TAX AND Bus. LAw., 142, 155-169 (1983). The article by Harris also de-
scribes the experience gained in operating the post-MTN dispute settlement procedures.
149. Bourgeois, supra note 3, at 17. This contrasts with the position under the Standards
Code, Article 14.23 of which provides that the Code's dispute settlement procedures must be
exhausted before Parties can invoke the GATT procedures. See also Harris, supra note 148, at
163.
150. Article VII(3)-(5).
151. Article VII(6). In practice, of course, the Committee attempts to resolve problems
concerning the operation and implementation of the Agreement at its periodic meetings, before
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Committee then investigates the matter "with a view to facilitating a mutu-
ally satisfactory solution." ' If no such solution can be reached, a panel
may be established to examine the matter, consult with the parties and pro-
vide a full opportunity to reach a mutually satisfactory solution, and make
a statement concerning the facts as they relate to application of the Agree-
ment and such findings as will assist the Committee in making recommen-
dations or giving rulings on the matter.1 58 The final step is appropriate ac-
tion by the Committee, including a statement concerning the facts,
recommendations to one or more of the Parties, and/or any other ruling it
deems appropriate. The Committee may in addition authorize "sanctions,"
i.e., the suspension of application of the Agreement, if its recommendations
are not accepted.'"
b. Evaluation. Several observations may be made concerning the pro-
cedures under the Agreement. First, it should be noted that the
"'prosecutorial" function resides in the aggrieved Party, which desires to
make a formal reference to the Committee. Precise definition of the claim is
difficult, however, because the rules themselves are frequently vague and
ambiguous; 55 and the focus of the claim is not on breach of the rules as
such but on the vague and ambiguous concept of "nullification or impair-
ment." ' " This detracts from the process of rule application and also places
a considerable burden on the panel.
1 5 7
The adjudicative function is performed by the panel. Despite improve-
ment in the panel procedure, particularly in the imposition of time limits
and guarantees of impartiality and independence, a crucial deficiency re-
these problems result in such a formal reference. For examples of the kinds of problems
brought to the Committee's attention, see, Meeting of the GATT Committee on Government
Procurement, INT'L PROCUREMENT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 48, Vol. 1, No. I at 5
(May 1983), Vol. 1, No. 2 at 5 (September 1983), Vol. 1, No. 3 at 7 (February 1984), Vol. 1,
No. 4 at I (May 1984), Vol. 2, No. I at 5 (August 1984).
152. Id.
153. Details of the panel procedure are found in Article VII(7)-(10).
154. Article VII(ll)-(14).
155. Bourgeois, supra note 3, at 13-14.
156. Article VII(4). See Jackson, supra note 6, at 43, 45. The concept of nullification or
impairment under the GATT (and presumably also under the MTN Agreement) relates to
damage to the trading expectations of the aggrieved Party. As the focus of the claim is on
"nullification or impairment," therefore, a breach of the rules is technically neither necessary
(see Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate case, 1950) nor sufficient (though GATT
practice has developed the concept of prima facie nullification or impairment inter alia where
there is a breach of GATT obligations). These matters are discussed further in J. JACKSON,
LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 2, at 424-28 and J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE, supra note 4, at
178-87. See also Harris, supra note 148, at 147.
157. Jackson, supra note 6, at 43.
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mains in that the panel, which acts as the adjudicatory body, also acts as
"conciliator." The "moral effect" of its determination, therefore, may con-
sequently be severely weakened."'
Another weakness in the procedure is that the remedies are adminis-
tered by the "political" Committee on Government Procurement. Again,
there have been some improvements in this area, such as time limits for
action, and a requirement that a Party which fails to implement a recom-
mendation give written justification. As in the case of the GATT itself,
however, it is doubtful whether sanctions in the form of authorized retalia-
tion will have any significant effect in securing compliance.""
Finally, the procedures may still operate to a large degree with refer-
ence to the relative power positions of the parties, rather than an agreed-
upon existing rule.16 This influences every stage in the procedures (includ-
ing that of panel "adjudication," given its additional role as conciliator) and
also results in the "filtering out" of certain "difficult" cases." ' Professor
Jackson has concluded that "few fundamental changes or improvements
can be found in the MTN Agreements" over the mechanism in GATT Ar-
ticles XXII and XXIII,:" a mechanism which already "enjoys less than
great confidence of the parties." 1 3
2. International Dispute Settlement and Enforcement in the European
Community
a. Overview of the procedures. The main provision for international
dispute settlement in the European Community is laid down in Article 169
of the EEC Treaty, which empowers the Commission to proceed against a
Member State, which it considers to be in violation of Community
Law-for example, by failing to ensure respect for the rules on government
procurement.'" This procedure is divided into two main stages, an adminis-
158. Id. at 46.
159. Id. at 41-42.
160. Id. at 46.
161. I.e., a political solution is reached, instead of a politically non-acceptable legal solu-
tion which might damage the system. Cf. Bourgeois, supra note 3, at 18.
162. Jackson, supra note 6, at 46.
163. Id. at 41, 43. The first formal reference to the Committee on Government Procure-
ment and subsequent establishment and investigation by a panel is discussed supra note 46
(complaint by United States against the practice of Member States of the European Commu-
nity excluding VAT from the contract price in calculating threshold value).
164. See e.g., Case 133/80 Commission v. Italian Republic, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
457 (failure to adopt national measures implementing Directive 77/62/EEC, the "Coordina-
tion" Directive). The full text of Article 169 of the Treaty is as follows:
If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfill an obligation
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trative stage and a judicial stage. In the administrative stage, the Commis-
sion gives the defendant Member State an opportunity to submit its case,
and then delivers a reasoned opinion. If the defendant State does not com-
ply with the Commission's opinion within the period laid down, the Com-
mission may then bring the matter before the Court of Justice. In this judi-
cial stage, if the Court finds that the defendant Member State has failed to
fulfill its obligations under the Treaty, then under Article 171 that State is
"required to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment."
b. Evaluation. There clearly exist some vital differences between this
procedure and the procedures under the MTN Agreement. One very signifi-
cant contrast with the MTN procedures is the central role played by the
Commission in its prosecutorial "watchdog" capacity as "guardian of the
Treaties."1 6 Thus the decision to enforce Community Law, at least through
use of the international dispute settlement and enforcement procedures
under Article 169, is the responsibility of an independent body which repre-
sents the interests of the Community as a whole.'"
under this Treaty, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter after giving the State
concerned the opportunity to submit its observations.
If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion within the period laid down
by the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the Court of Justice.
Article 170 of the EEC Treaty provides a closer analogue to the GATT-MTN procedures,
in that it empowers one Member State to proceed against another Member State for failure to
fulfill an obligation under the Treaty. A preliminary "administrative stage" before the Com-
mission is also a necessary component of this procedure. This remedy is not discussed sepa-
rately, however. Apart from the prosecutorial function, it does not differ fundamentally from
the procedure under Article 169, and is in any event used very infrequently. Before a problem
results in a formal proceeding under Article 169 or 170, the Commission in practice would
doubtless attempt to seek a resolution within the Advisory Committee for Public Contracts.
This Committee, which the Council established within the Commission in 1971 (originally
only for public works contracts), is composed of representatives of the Member States meeting
under the chairmanship of a Commission official. The function of the Committee is to examine
problems concerning application of the Council Directives on contracts for public works and
public supplies. Council Decision 71/306/EEC of July 26, 1971, 14 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
185) 15 (1971), as amended by Council Decision 77/63/EEC of December 21, 1976, 19 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 13) 15 (1977). See further, Turpin, supra note 100, at 424. Compare the
discussion, supra note 151, on the Committee on Government Procurement.
A Member State violation of a provision in an international agreement between the Com-
munity and a non-Member State (e.g., the MTN Agreement on Government Procurement)
would also probably be regarded as a violation of Community law justifying enforcement pro-
ceedings under Articles 169 or 170. See T. HARTLEY, supra note 120, at 286.
165. Under Article 155 of the EEC Treaty, one of the tasks of the Commission is to
"ensure that the provisions of this Treaty and the measures taken by the institutions pursuant
thereto are applied."
166. See Article 10 of the Merger Treaty, supra note 15.
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In addition, the claim is defined much more precisely, because the ap-
plicable rules of Community Law are themselves more precise, and there is
no concept akin to "nullification or impairment," or indeed damage or harm
of any nature. The adjudicative function, moreover, is performed by a com-
pletely impartial body (the Court of Justice), with no attempt at concilia-
tion with reference to the relevant power positions of the parties.
The remedy is also administered by the Court of Justice, and not by
the "political" Council of Ministers. The remedy consists in a declaration
whose consequences are determined by the Treaty itself. Finally, the proce-
dure as a whole operates with much greater reference to the rules than the
relative power positions of the Member States. In particular, there is no
formal "consultation" or "conciliation" phase administered by the "politi-
cal" Council of Ministers.
One the other hand, despite the superior nature of this Community
international dispute settlement and enforcement mechanism as compared
with the procedures in the Government Procurement Agreement, its effec-
tiveness is nevertheless subject to certain limitations. First, the Commission
is unable to uncover every breach of Community obligations by a Member
State. In addition, the procedure may involve extensive delays. "Political"
considerations may enter into the Commission's decision as to how a resolu-
tion to the dispute can be most effectively achieved in a particular case.
Whenever "difficult" cases do arise, moreover, the Commission may delay
in bringing the matter before the Court of Justice. Finally, even where a
successful action is brought against a Member State in the Court of Justice,
compliance with the Court's judgment depends, under Article 171 of the
Treaty, upon the "good faith" of the Member State concerned.16
B. Direct Application of the International Rules on Government
Procurement by a Domestic Court
1. Introduction: Central Issues
Where a national government fails to ensure respect for the interna-
167. However, the Commission attempts to ensure that the Member States take the nec-
essary steps to comply with the Court's judgment, without undue delay. See e.g., Answer of
the Commission to W.Q. 988/83, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 335) 34 (1983). If necessary,
the Commission may bring a further enforcement action under Article 169 for failure to fulfill
the obligations under Article 171. See e.g., Case 48/71 Commission v. Italian Republic, 1972
Eur. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 527, Cases 24/80R and 97/80R Commission v. France, 1980 Eur.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1319, see Fourteenth General Report on the Activities of the European
Communities in 1980, pp. 301 and 307 (1981).
For a more detailed discussion of the procedure under Article 169, see T. HARTLEY, supra
note 120, at 283-305.
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tional rules on government procurement in its domestic legal system, for
example because it either fails to adopt any implementing measures at all
or because those measures result in defective implementation, 16s compliance
with the rules may still be ensured to the extent that the domestic courts
apply the international rule directly, particularly in any dispute between a
purchasing authority and a private individual. The existence and extent of
such direct "penetration" and application of the international rules will de-
pend on the attitude of the courts in resolving three central issues. The first
issue is whether the domestic courts are prepared to recognize an interna-
tional norm as such as a "source of law". In other words, is the legal system
"open" to international law, or do the courts only recognize domestic law
norms as a "source of law". This is traditionally viewed as relating to the
method of "incorporating" or "receiving" international law into the domes-
tic legal system. If the domestic legal system is "closed" to international
law, the norm of international law can only be applied by the courts after it
has been "transformed" into a norm of domestic law.1"' The remaining two
168. Article IX(4)(a) of the Agreement on Government Procurement provides that:
Each government accepting or acceding to this Agreement shall ensure, not later than the
date of entry into force of this Agreement for it, the conformity of its laws, regulations
and administrative procedures, and the rules, procedures and practices applied by the
entities contained in its list annexed hereto, with the provisions of this Agreement.
As far as the relevant provisions of European Community law are concerned:
(1) Article 30 states that measures with equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions on
imports "shall ... be prohibited between Member States."
(2) Article 4 of the Commission Directive 70/32/EEC states that "Member States shall
take all necessary measures to abolish measures which have an equivalent effect to quan-
titative restrictions and arise from the provisions referred to in Article 3...".
(3) Article 30 of the Council Coordination Directive 77/62/EEC provides that "Member
States shall adopt the measures necessary to comply with this Directive within 18 months
of its notification. ..".
(4) Article 9 of the Council "Adaptation" Directive provides that "Member States shall
adopt the measures necessary to comply with this Directive not later than 1 January
1981."
169. If the domestic jurisdiction is "strongly dualist," a norm of international law is never
available to the domestic judge; in each case, the norm must be converted into a norm of
domestic law before it can be applied by a court (the "transformation" theory).
Actual practice is more nuanced, however. Thus, the courts may recognize customary
international law as a "source of law," while denying such status to treaty law, as for example
in British practice.
On the other hand, if the domestic jurisdiction is "monist" (international law and domes-
tic law are part of the same system) or "weakly dualist," (two different systems but interna-
tional law is "adopted" by act of the sovereign), then the international law norm will be avail-
able to the domestic judge as such as a source of law.
For a more detailed discussion of the various theories, see D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW, 38-46 (2nd. ed. 1970); J. STARKE, INTRODuCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, 68-
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issues are only presented, therefore, if the legal system is "open" to interna-
tional law.
The second issue concerns the effects in the domestic legal system of
recognizing an international norm as such as a "source of law". In particu-
lar, does the norm directly alter the legal position of individuals, enabling
them to invoke it in a dispute with their national authorities? In traditional
U.S. terminology, a provision in an international agreement may only be
directly invoked by individuals if it is "self-executing". In European Com-
munity law, a provision may only be invoked if it has "direct effect".'"
The third issue is the status of a norm of international law which has
been incorporated as such into the domestic legal system. This involves con-
sideration of the primacy of one norm over the other, in the case of any
conflict between an international law norm and a domestic law norm. This
issue may be presented in several different contexts, at the national level or,
in a federal state, also at the state level. These contexts include the status of
the international law norm relative to prior domestic legislation, implement-
ing legislation, subsequent legislation, and constitutional law norms.1 7 1,
International law does not require the domestic courts of a state to
adopt any particular attitude to the reception of international law into the
domestic legal system. Thus a state may perform its international obliga-
tions by correctly "transforming" international norms which are intended to
be effective within the domestic system.
On the other hand, an effective mechanism of direct penetration and
application by the domestic courts, in which the national governments are
"by-passed", not only increases the level of compliance with international
rules (and hence their effectiveness), but such judicial implementation may
also thereby ensure that the state does not in fact act in breach of its inter-
national obligations. 1
7
74 (9th ed. 1984). See also March Hunnings, Enforceability of the EEC-E.F.T.A. Free Trade
Agreements: A Rejoinder,.3 EuR. L. REV. 278, 278-79 (1978).
170. It is possible, of course, to envisage a variety of "direct effects":
(1) Direct effects in the relationship of the individual and the national authorities.
This may be termed "vertical direct effect," and may involve:
(a) obligations of the national authorities and correlative rights of the
individual;
(b) obligations of the individual and correlative rights of the national
authorities.
(2) Direct effects in the relationship of individuals inter se-this may be termed
"horizontal direct effect."
For present purposes, the discussion is restricted to (1)(a), i.e., "vertical direct effects"
involving obligations of the national authorities and correlative rights of the individual.
171. For example, guarantees of fundamental human rights.
172. At least if the obligation on the state is an "obligation of result" (the state can
[Vol. 8
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
2. Direct Penetration and Application of the Rules of the GA TT and the
MTN Agreement on Government Procurement
The existence and extent of direct penetration and application of the
rules of the GATT and the MTN Agreement on Government Procurement
in the domestic legal systems of the respective Parties is a matter of state
practice, dependent upon the attitude of the national judiciaries in resolving
the issues discussed above as matters of domestic constitutional law. State
practice and judicial attitudes may, of course, vary considerably.
For example, the legal systems of both the United States and the Euro-
pean Community are "open" to international agreements, which are there-
fore automatically "incorporated" as a "source of law" for the domestic
judge.178 However, judicial attitudes vary, regarding both the effect and the
status of an international agreement thus incorporated into the domestic
legal system.
In the United States, several courts have considered the GATT to be
"self-executing" and have permitted individuals to invoke its provisions to
challenge state laws.'7 4 The language of the Trade Agreements Act of
1979, however, which approved the MTN Agreements and implemented
them into U.S. law, would appear to exclude any possibility of recognizing
their provisions as "self-executing". 7 5 In the European Community, on the
choose the appropriate means of implementation) rather than an "obligation of conduct" (duty
placed on a particular organ). See e.g., Wyatt, New Legal Order or Old?, 7 EUR. L. REV. 147,
152-53 (1982).
173. In the case of the United States, Article VI, cl. 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides
that ". . . all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme law of the Land."
On the confusion between the two distinct concepts of incorporation and the "self-execut-
ing" nature of treaties in the United States, see Winter, Direct Applicability and Direct Ef-
fect, Two Distinct and Different Concepts in Community Law, 9 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 425,
427-28 (1972).
It seems that executive agreements may also be automatically incorporated, so as to be-
come the "supreme law" of the land, with similar effects and status (at least in the case of
congressional-executive agreements).
For the European Community, see Case 181/73, Haegeman v. Belgium, supra note 139,
at consideration 5. See also the discussion in Bebr, Agreements Concluded by the Community
and Their Possible Direct Effect: From International Fruit Company to Kupferberg, 20 COM-
MON MKT. L. REV, 35, 39 (1983) and Jackson, Louis & Matsushita, supra note 5, at 290.
For a general comparison of the European Community System with the U.S. Federal
System, see supra notes 20 and 21 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 2, at 408. For an extensive in-
depth analysis of the position of the GATT in U.S. law, see Jackson, The General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REV. 249 (1967). See also
Olson, supra 112, at 177.
175. See Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Articles 3(a) and 3(f), Pub. L. No. 96-39 §503,
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other hand, the Court of Justice has denied the "direct effect" of the
GATT, 17  whereas the question appears to remain open in the case of the
MTN Agreements.17 7 Consequently, an aggrieved supplier or importer may
be able to invoke the "direct effect" of the MTN Agreement on Govern-
ment Procurement before a national court of a Member State, in any dis-
pute with a covered entity, if the criteria for "direct effect" are satisfied.
178
93 Stat. 144 (1979). In the United States the courts look to the "subjective intent" of the
draftsmen in order to determine whether an agreement is "self-executing." This intent is mani-
fested primarily by the language of the agreement and secondarily by the preparatory work (in
particular that of the U.S. draftsmen). If the agreement requires Congressional approval, the
manifestation of intent by Congress is a major, perhaps conclusive, factor. See Jackson, Louis
& Matsushita, supra note 5, at 374-75.
176. Joined Cases 21-24/72, International Fruit Co. Nb. v. Produktshap voor Groenten
en Fruit 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1219; Case 9/73 Schluter v. Hauptzollamt Lorrach 1973
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1135.
The Court has confirmed its denial of the direct effect of the GATT, as well as its reason-
ing, in two recent cases - Case 266/81 La Societa Italiana per l'Oleodotto Transalpino
(SLOT) v. le Minstere Italien des Finances et al., 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 731, 780 at
consideration 28; Joined Cases 267/81, 268/81 and 269/81 l'Administration des Finances de
l'Etat v. la Societa Petrolifera Italiana S.P.A. (S.P.I.) et al., 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 801,
830, at considerations 23 and 24. For a comprehensive review of the cases before the Court of
Justice involving GATT, see Petersmann, P. Application of GA TT by the Court of Justice of
the European Communities, 20 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 397 (1983).
177. See Jackson, Louis and Matsushita, supra note 5, at 294-95.
178. Although the jurisprudence of the Court is still evolving in this area of the direct
effect of international agreements in the Community legal system, the following tentative con-
clusions, based in particular on the GATT cases and the Kupferberg Case, may be advanced:
(1) Firstly, as far as the "nature" or "system" of an agreement is concerned, the Court
may still recognize direct effect, despite:
a) the existence of a special institutional framework for consultation and negotia-
tions among the contracting parties concerning performance of the agreement (Case
104/81 Kupferberg, at consideration 20)
b) the existence of safeguard clauses (Case 104/81 Kupferberg, consideration 21)
c) the refusal by the courts of another contracting party to give direct effect to the
agreement. How a party ensures reciprocal performance in good faith is within its
discretion (unless the agreement itself specifies the measures to be taken) (Case
104/81 Kupferberg, consideration 18).
(2) Secondly, the wording of the provision must satisfy the general criteria for "direct
effect" applied to provisions of Community law origin, i.e., it must be precise and uncon-
ditional (see infra note 185 and accompanying text.). This question is determined in the
context and framework of the agreement of which it forms part. In particular, the Court
will have regard'to:
a) the object and purpose of the Agreement (Case 104/81 Kupferberg, considera-
tion 23).
b) certain features of the "system" of the Agreement:
(i) Does the provision require intervention within the institutional framework
in order to become precise and unconditional?
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In the United States, broadly speaking, an international agreement
may prevail over all inconsistent state legislation, prior or subsequent, as
well as inconsistent prior federal legislation. It does not, however, prevail
over inconsistent subsequent federal legislation' 9 In the European Com-
munity, by contrast, an international agreement concluded by the Commu-
nity appears to prevail over all inconsistent Member State legislation as
well as Community legislation, whether prior or subsequent.180
(ii) Is the use of the safeguard clauses strictly circumscribed?
In Kupferberg, no preliminary intervention within the institutional framework was re-
quired for the provisions to become precise and unconditional; moreover, the safeguard clauses
could only apply under specific circumstances and, as a general rule, after examination of the
joint committee (Case 104/81 Kupferberg, considerations 20 and 21).
In the case of the GATT, however, the Court has stressed "the great flexibility of its
provisions, in particular those conferring the possibility of derogation, the measures to be taken
when confronted with exceptional difficulties and the settlement of conflicts between the con-
tracting parties" (Cases 21-24/72, International Fruit, at consideration 21).
On this analysis the difference in results (direct effect of the provision of the free trade
agreement between the Community and Portugal at issue in Kupferberg, no direct effect of the
provisions of the GATT) may be explained by the differing contexts and frameworks of the
two agreements, which determine whether a provision of the agreement is precise and
unconditional.
Petersmann is of the view, however, that the Court should recognize the direct effect of
the GATT, because many of its provisions are precise and unconditional and there is in fact no
essential difference between the context and framework of the GATT and that of many other
international agreements, including free trade agreements such as in Kupferberg. See
Petersmann, supra note 176, 429-36.
(3) Thirdly, although the Court never appears to have articulated this as a reason, it may
perhaps be more willing to recognize the direct effect of a bilateral agreement than a
multilateral agreement, particularly one with such a large membership as the GATT.
Applying the above analysis to the Agreement on Government Procurement, the most
serious obstacle to direct effect of its provisions is perhaps its multilateral nature, and the
possible lack of precision of the individual provision in question.
For a comprehensive review of the cases in this area, see Bebr, supra note 173; Jackson,
Louis & Matsushita, supra note 5, at 292-96; Bourgeois, supra note 3, at 25-26; Petersmann,
supra note 176.
It may be noted that, in contrast to the approach in the United States, based on the
"subjective intent" of the draftsmen or intent of the legislature, criteria for the direct effect of
an international agreement in Community Law are much more "objective." Indeed, it appears
that the subjective interpretation principle, based on the intention of the parties, has been
losing support in international law. See Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transna-
tional Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 9 (1981).
179. See D.P. O'CONNELL, supra note 169, at 62-65; J. STARKE, supra note 169, at 80-
82.
180. See Jackson, Louis & Matsushita, supra note 5, at 290; Bourgeois, supra note 3, at
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3. Direct Penetration and Application of the Rules of European Commu-
nity Law 81
The national constitutional laws and judicial attitudes again show con-
siderable variation among the Member States of the European Community,
with respect to the direct penetration and application of international law in
general.181 In the case of European Community law, on the other hand,
there is largely uniform practice recognizing a very extensive direct pene-
tration and application of the Community legal system within all the Mem-
ber States.
This uniform practice is essentially the result of three main related
factors. First, there is the Court of Justice, which has formulated various
propositions of Community law resolving the issues relevant to the direct
penetration and application of Community law within the Member States.
Second, these doctrines have largely been generally accepted by the na-
tional judiciaries. Third, a preliminary ruling procedure is set forth under
Article 177 of the EEC Treaty. Each of these factors will now be consid-
ered in turn.
a. Propositions formulated by the Court of Justice. The various pro-
positions of Community law, which have been formulated by the Court,
may be summarized as follows.
The "incorporation" of Community Law and the Community legal sys-
tem within the Member States. In the view of the Court of Justice, Commu-
nity law and the Community legal system apply as such within a Member
State, merely as a result of its entry into the Community. This is clear from
the Court's claim in Costa v. ENEL:
By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty has
created its own legal system which, on the entry into force of the
Treaty, became an integral part of the legal systems of the Member
States and which their courts are bound to apply. 8
The "direct effect" of provisions of Community law. Although the ter-
minology of the Court is not without ambiguity, it seems that if a provision
181. The subject of this sub-section is discussed generally in Stein, supra note 178; Jones,
supra note 19, at 32-50.
182. For a survey of the constitutional position in the original six Member States, see
Bebr, Law of the European Communities and Municipal Law, 34 MoD. L. REV. 481, 485-87
(1971); Sasse, The Common Market: Between International and Municipal Law, 75 YALE
L.J. 695, 705-13, 740-41 (1966); Jones, supra note 19, at n.128.
183. Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL, at 593.
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of Community law has "direct effect", this means that it directly modifies
the legal position of individuals, in particular enabling them directly to in-
voke the provision against the national authorities.'" A particular provision
of Community law, whether imposing a prohibition, or a duty to take ac-
tion, may only produce such a "direct effect" if its wording satisfies certain
criteria. First, the provision must be clear and unambiguous. Second, it
must be unconditional, and in particular its operation must not be depen-
dent upon the expiration of an unexpired time limit, or a discretionary deci-
sion-making power within the control of an independent authority, such as
a Community institution, or national authorities of a Member State.1 85
Regulations, which under Article 189 of the EEC Treaty are "directly
applicable", may clearly produce "direct effects" if these criteria are satis-
fied. In addition, however, despite the opposition of Member State govern-
ments, the Court of Justice has extensively recognized the "direct effect" of
non-"directly applicable" Treaty provisions,se as well as Directives and De-
cisions addressed to Member States.18 7
Indeed, it has been said that the direct effect of provisions of Commu-
nity law is the rule rather than the exception.'" In reaching this result the
Court of Justice appears to have been influenced largely by two central
considerations. First of all, the Court has recognized that the "spirit" of the
EEC Treaty involved the creation of a new and autonomous legal order,
whose subjects comprise not only Member States but also private individu-
als.180 The Court has therefore seen as one of its prime tasks the need to
make this new legal order and Community Constitution a living reality, by
shaping a Community constitutional law, in particular to guarantee private
184. On the other possible kinds of "direct effect," see supra note 170.
185. Compare T. HARTLEY, supra note 120, at 190-97.
186. Beginning with Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos.
187. See the evolution of the Court's case law in Case 9/70 Franz Grad v. Finanzamt
Traunstein, 1970 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 825; Case 41/74 Yvonne van Duvn v. Home Office,
1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1337; Case 148/78 Pubblico Ministero v. Tullio Ratti, 1979 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1629; Case 8/81 Ursula Becker v. Finanzamt M~inster-Innenstadt, 1982 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 53.
The term "directly applicable" in Article 189 appears to mean not only that a regulation
requires no further implementing measures to perfect its normative character (it is "legally
perfect") but also that, unless authorized by the regulation itself, any such implementing mea-
sures, i.e., "transformation" into a national law norm by the national authorities, would in fact
be improper. See, in general, the discussion in T. HARTLEY, supra note 120, at 201-04.
On the other hand, in the case of many Treaty provisions, as well as Directives and Deci-
sions addressed to Member States, such "transformation" is both envisaged and required.
188. T. HARTLEY, supra note 120, at 196.
189. See Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos, at 12.
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individuals the "rights which become part of their legal heritage."' " Sec-
ondly, the Court clearly considers that exclusive reliance upon the interna-
tional dispute settlement and enforcement procedures under Articles 169
and 170 of the EEC Treaty would greatly reduce the effectiveness of Com-
munity law, whereas enabling private individuals directly to invoke their
rights under Community law before the national courts greatly enhances its
effectiveness.19
Consequently, if a purchasing authority in a Member State fails to
observe the rules governing intra-Community trade in the area of govern-
ment procurement, in a suitable case an aggrieved individual could directly
invoke the prohibition in Article 30, which the court has already held to be
directly effective. 19 In addition, provided that the criteria for "direct ef-
fect" are satisfied, the individual may also be able to invoke provisions of
the Commission Directive and the Council Coordination Directive."
The "supremacy" of Community law. Despite the absence of any ex-
plicit provision in the Treaties providing for the supremacy of Community
law over national law in the event of a conflict, the Court of Justice never-
theless takes the view that such a rule is to be implied and has thus un-
equivocally recognized the absolute and unqualified supremacy of directly
effective Community law over conflicting national legislation, prior and
subsequent. 1"
190. Id.
191. Id. at 13.
[A] restriction of the guarantees against an infringement of Article 12 by Member
States to the procedures under Articles 169 and 170 would remove all direct legal protec-
tion of the individual rights of their nationals. There is the risk that recourse to the
procedure under these Articles would be ineffective if it were to occur after the imple-
mentation of a national decision taken contrary to the provisions of the Treaty.
The vigilance of individuals concerned to protect their rights amounts to an effective
supervision in addition to the supervision entrusted by Articles 169 and 170 to the dili-
gence of the Commission and of the Member States.
See also Case 9/70 Franz Grad, at 837.
192. See Case 74/76 Jannelli, at 575.
193. As well as the "Adaptation" Directive. Cf. Case 76/81 SA Transporoute et Travaux
v. Minister of Public Works, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 417 (preliminary ruling on the inter-
pretation of Council Directives 71/304 and 71/305 on the abolition of restrictions on freedom
to provide services in respect of public works contracts, and on the coordination of procedures
for the award of public works contracts respectively); see supra notes 94 and 100. For an
annotation on this case, see Gormley, Public Works Contracts and the Freedom to Provide
Services, 133 NEw LAW J. 533 (1983).
194. Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL; Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato
v. Simmenthal, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 629. Community Law also prevails over funda-
mental rights guarantees in the national constitutions.
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b. General acceptance of these propositions by the national judiciar-
ies. These various propositions of the Court of Justice relating to the incor-
poration, direct effect and supremacy of Community law have in fact been
largely accepted by the national judiciaries in all the Member States. 1"9
Indeed, in the absence of such acceptance, these doctrines would remain
theoretical propositions of law-albeit perfectly "valid" within Community
law-made by one system (Community law) about another system (na-
tional law).
c. The preliminary ruling procedure under Article 177 of the EEC
Treaty. The preliminary ruling procedure under Article 177 of the EEC
Treaty'" has played a crucial role in ensuring the effective and extensive
direct penetration and application of Community law and the Community
legal system within the Member States. The existence of the procedure has
given the Court of Justice an opportunity to develop the various doctrines
discussed above in two ways. First, under Article 177 the Court possesses
jurisdiction inter alia to give preliminary rulings on the "interpretation" of
the Treaty and acts of the institutions of the Community. The Court has
characterized the issues of "direct effect" and "supremacy" as questions of
"interpretation" and has thus arrogated to itself jurisdiction to shape the
"Community Constitution". Secondly, the procedure ensures that issues of
Community law arising in the national courts do in fact come before the
Court of Justice and are resolved in accordance with Community law, so as
to ensure the full and uniform application of Community law in all the
Member States. This is because a court or tribunal may always ask for a
preliminary ruling if it considers a decision on the question of Community
law necessary to enable it to give judgment, while a court or tribunal of last
resort must refer such a "necessary" question, unless it has already been
decided by the Court in another case.197
195. See Jones, supra note 19, at 46-47.
196. Article 177 of the EEC Treaty provides as follows:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community;
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the Council, where
those statutes so provide.
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State,
that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to
enable it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a
Member State, against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law,
that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of Justice.
197. Or unless the correct application of Community law is "so obvious as to leave no
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In addition, the better view appears to be that preliminary rulings have
effect "erga omnes", so that not just the court making the reference but all
national courts and tribunals- in all the Member States are bound by the
ruling even though it is open to them to make another reference to recon-
sider the question.'
In general, the creation of such an "organic link" for mutual judicial
cooperation between the Court of Justice and all the national judiciaries,
with the aim of ensuring the uniform application of Community law, devel-
ops confidence in the system and thus itself helps to generate an attitude of
acceptance among the various judiciaries as well as greater respect for the
rules of the system in general.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Attempts have been made at the international level, both within the
GATT-MTN system and the European Community, to liberalize interna-
tional trade and stimulate international competition in the government pro-
curement market by removing the many visible and less visible barriers to
such trade and competition which result from national laws, regulations,
administrative rules and practices in the area of government purchasing.
Although the GATT itself does not seek to remove such barriers to
trade, one of the more significant results of the Tokyo Round of Multilat-
eral Trade Negotiations was the conclusion of an Agreement on Govern-
ment Procurement, which entered into force on January 1, 1981.'" This
scope for any reasonable doubt," Case 283/81 CILFIT v. Ministry of Health, 1982 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 3415, 3432. See also the discussion in T. HARTLEY, supra note 120, at 269-72.
198. See T. HARTLEY, supra note 120, at 280-82. The Court has already established that
a preliminary ruling declaring an act of a Community institution invalid has such an erga
omnes effect. Case 166/80 International Chem. Corp. v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello
Stato, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1191, 1223. It has not yet decided, however, whether a
preliminary. interpretative ruling has such an effect.
199. The U.S. Senate Finance Committee, for example, estimated that the Agreement
would open up a new potential market of $20 billion for U.S. exporters. See S. Rep. No. 249,
96th Cong., Ist Sess., 128, 141, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 381, 514
and 527. The General Accounting Office (GAO), however, has recently published a less en-
couraging assessment of the commerical value of the Agreement to U.S. companies. According
to the GAO report, the Agreement has had "far less commercial value than originally antici-
pated." Among the reasons given for this result are: the 150,000 SDR threshold cut off; the
widespread use of single tendering procedures; repeated instances of non-compliance; the exis-
tence of previous agreements and practices that had already opened up foreign government
procurement to U.S. companies; the inability of U.S. companies to sell competitively abroad.
See, GAO, REPORT No. GAO/NSIAD-84-117, THE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON Gov-
ERNMENT PROCUREMENT: AN ASSESSMENT OF ITS COMMERCIAL VALUE AND U.S. GOVERN-
MENT IMPLEMENTATION, (1984), as summarized in GAO Says Activity Under GATT Procure-
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attempt, at the more general international level, to remove barriers to trade
in the field of government procurement between signatories to the Agree-
ment, was preceded by measures taken at the regional level within the Eu-
ropean Community. The structure of regulation differs, however, within the
two systems. Unlike the GATT-MTN system, where the relevant rules are
found in a single international agreement, EEC regulation is achieved
through a combination of a Treaty provision (Article 30 of the EEC
Treaty) and legislative measures in the form of a Commission Directive,
adopted to effectuate the prohibition in Article 30, and a Council "Coordi-
nation" Directive designed to supplement that prohibition, by coordinating
procedures for the award of public supply contracts.
Although the problems faced within the two systems are similar and
the solutions comparable, an appreciation of certain vital differences be-
tween the two systems is essential, not only for understanding the structure
of the systems themselves, but also for assessing the degree of likely compli-
ance with, and effectiveness of, the rules adopted within those systems. Al-
though the focus of this article has been on the removal of barriers to trade
in the field of government purchasing, these considerations are clearly of
more general application as well.
The European Community represents a unique and particularly inten-
sive form of international cooperation and integration at the regional level,
which differs from more traditional international regimes, such as that of
the GATT-MTN system, both in the scope of its objectives and activities
(i.e., creation of a "common market", not merely liberalization of trade in
goods), as well as in the sophistication of its institutional structure for rule
formulation and dispute settlement. This institutional structure is charac-
terized by the endowment of "sovereign powers" upon those institutions to
regulate the community of Member States and private individuals, as well
as by the creation of a well-developed "legal system" which has become an
integral part of the legal systems of the Member States.
One result of these vital differences between the two systems is the
creation of certain unique problems within the EEC, resulting from the dis-
tribution of "sovereign competences" between central and subordinate units
of government. The sovereignty of Member States is limited not only in
their internal mutual relations (intra-Community trade) but also in their
external relations with third countries, since the Community possesses ex-
clusive power under Article 113 in the area of the common commercial
ment Code is Modest, Offers Recommendations, I INT'L TRADE REP. CURRENT REPORTS
(BNA) 90-91 (July 25, 1984) and The GATT Agreement on Government Procurement:
GAO's Most Recent Assessment, INT'L PROCUREMENT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 48,
Vol. 2, No. 1 at 9 and 12 (August 1984).
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policy.
On the other hand, despite the transfer of "sovereign competences" to
the European Community that has already occurred, it is frequently diffi-
cult to develop the political will necessary for further relinquishment of
Member State sovereignty. Thus the EEC Council adopted a "minimalist"
approach in introducing certain more favorable provisions of the MTN
Agreement into the intra-Community regime, thereby declining to follow
the lead of the Commission, which sought to make use of an opportunity to
increase still further the degree of liberalization already achieved. Simi-
larly, national commercial policy measures regarding procurement not cov-
ered by the Agreement remain unharmonized in trade with third countries,
even though exclusive Community competence in the common commercial
policy area may necessitate Community authorization for the maintenance
of such differing measures.
A further result of the differences between the two systems is that, as
may be expected, the solutions to the problem of barriers to trade in the
area of government procurement reflect the different degrees of cooperation
and integration. Thus, the scope of regulation is much wider in the EEC,
and the rules contained in Article 30 and the various Directives are on the
whole stricter and more precisely formulated.
Furthermore, the more highly developed dispute settlement and en-
forcement mechanisms within the Community system ensure a greater like-
lihood of compliance with the rules of the system in general and the rules
on government procurement in particular. This is not simply due to the
superior nature of the "international" dispute settlement and enforcement
mechanism under Article 169. Indeed, this mechanism alone is probably
inadequate to ensure effective compliance with Community law. Of far
greater importance is the largely uniform judicial practice recognizing the
extensive direct penetration and application of Community law and the
Community legal system within the Member States, which enables the pri-
vate individual to invoke the "international" rule directly in a suitable case
and thereby to enforce the rules of the system as a "private policeman" in a
private dispute with the national authorities. This particular feature of the
Community system is largely the result of the existence of a Community
Court of Justice and an organic link between that Court and the national
judiciaries under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty.
By contrast, in the GATT-MTN system, serious deficiencies remain in
the international dispute settlement and enforcement mechanism under the
Agreement on Government Procurement. In addition, any possibility of di-
rect penetration and application of the rules of the Agreement within the
signatory states depends on the varying attitudes of the national judiciaries
(including the judiciary of the Community "legal system"). Prospects for
effective compliance will therefore depend to a greater extent upon the good
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faith of the governments of the signatories. Even within the Community
system, with its more highly developed dispute settlement and enforcement
mechanisms, the extent of actual compliance with the rules on government
procurement is unclear.2 0'
Prospects for effective compliance with the rules of the GATT-MTN
system would be enhanced by improvements in the dispute settlement and
enforcement mechanisms. It is perhaps unrealistic to expect the creation of
judicial mechanisms, for "international" dispute settlement and enforce-
ment (comparable to Article 169), or for ensuring uniform penetration and
application of the rules between contracting parties (comparable to Article
177). However, one more modest improvement would be the creation of an
impartial body to perform "watchdog" and "prosecutorial" functions, with
recourse to another impartial body performing the adjudication function,
under a set of more precise procedures operating with greater regard to the
rules than to the respective power positions of the parties. 1 Direct access
to the international procedures by the private individual could also be con-
sidered.202 Moreover, greater judicial willingness to recognize the direct
penetration and application of the GATT and MTN Agreements within the
domestic legal systems of contracting parties would also strengthen the
GATT-MTN system and increase prospects for effective compliance. 02
200. Cf. Bourgeois, supra note 3, at 32.
201. Works relevant to the reform of GATT-MTN dispute settlement and enforcement
procedures include: PANEL ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY AND INSTITUTIONS, AMERICAN
SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, STUDIES IN TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL POLICY No. 12, RE-
MAKING THE SYSTEM OF WORLD TRADE: A PROPOSAL FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORM (1976),
extracted in J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 2, at 375-77; Jackson, The Crumbling
Institutions of the Liberal Trade System, 12 J. WORLD TRADE L. 93, 103-105 (1978); Harris,
supra note 148, at 169-76.
202. See J. Jackson, Louis & Matsushita, supra note 5, at 394-96.
203. See Editorial Comment, 20 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 393 (1983); Petersmann, supra
note 176, at 426, 436.
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